CRM - Nationalities and feasibility

[Pontius Navigator]

TAM, were you around when MACR pay rise meant they got paid more than a flt lt?

Entering a warm situation with the earliest sniff on a single Jez in the barrier: "what would you advise Mr Cross?"

Of course when it was hot it was straight in, fill your boots.

[Rossian]

To answer Ex ascot's earlier question ie who calls who what - LHS P1/ RHS co / eng eng /Route nav/ tacnav/ Aeo/ Lead wet/ Lead dry.
As time moved on while tracking closely we used the "loop" ie where do we think the target is? Tac nav position course speed/Rout nav PCS/ Aeo PCS./ lead wet PCS. Variations were ironed out/argued over and the target marker was modified (or not) as appropriate. It worked and bloody well. No ***** we were pretty damn good at it. Because it involved ALL the key players down the back whose judgements were valued equally.
The USN "seemed" to discount any input from the enlisted operators showing independent thinking. I did hope that the involvement of the experienced nimrod crews in the P8 school in Jacksonville might bring some incremental change in the USN. I doubt if anyone from there will want to comment. We spent a great deal of time and effort in properly training all crew members in their own speciality and also involved them in ALL the crew actions.

The Ancient Mariner

[Brian W May]

Still can't get my mind around Kipper Fleet operations with the aircraft commander down the back. So if you are addressing the guy in the LHS what do you call him? Pilot? Guess so. At one point I had a boss (Wg Cdr) Nav. I self authorized and was the boss in the air. Actually also down route. It was never a problem. I think he liked to just sit back and be a member of the crew with no decisions to make. Great guy. Now owns a vineyard in France.

Was told/ordered to fly RHS VC10 on one occasion for the Stn Cdr who wanted to take some brass up to demonstrate AAR. He wasn't qualified on the C MK1 only the K. I wasn't qualified (refused to do) tanking. Can't recall who the brass was an AM or summat. We climbed to altitude and then the Stn Cdr started to fly towards another VC10. I kept declaring air miss. Then he tries to stick this huge pitot tube looking thing on the nose into a basket on the end of a hosepipe dangling behind the other aircraft. I couldn't watch. Neither could the AM, he was fast asleep in the jump seat. He woke up just before landing when the Stn Cdr decided that he was going to impress the AM by making a Royal/VIP type doors open arrival time. I advised him that it was not possible as we were running late. He said that he could make it by turning off half way down the runway. I told him it was not possible. But no he was the Stn Cdr. So he plonked it on the ground. Stood on the brakes so hard that the AM almost ended up across the central console. Turned off and got on stand just about on time. He had a big grin on his face, until the tyres started blowing. We lurched to one side. The AM didn't have so many steps as normal to go down to get off but nearly got covered in foam by the fire section. Guess who got to write the incident report and take it with his butty box to his office. Tried hard to keep the grin off my face.

Okay . . . and?

[Ex-Ascot]

Fair cop Brian. Well, we changed the tyres. Apart from that no idea. He never flew one of aircraft again though. Got stuck with the grubby grey ones on the tanker Sqn (101). Also no idea what happened to the boss of 216 Sqn and the boss of the OCU who took a Tristar up together and tried an auto land completely wrecking the aircraft and covering the whole of BZN and half of Carterton in Avtur.

[Pontius Navigator]

Ex-A, I was on the first T* into MPA. The Captain was the same one as above, ex-VC10 sqn ldr. I was on the jump seat. As we made the approach he announced his decision to use auto-land. If course I thought nothing of it but did notice the co do a double take and look across.

No other FW aircraft had ever touched down there. Even the C130 calibrator had not been permitted to touch down there. The back of the aircraft was packed with junior VIPs, gp capts etc and I guess routine SLF.

It was only later that I found auto-land was not yet authorised at MPA, nor was the aircraft cleared or the Captain authorised. I believe he retired after the incident above.

[Boac]

Returning to the thread topic, the question is why did the 'co' in post #25 not speak up and take control if necessary? Did he not know it was not authorised, fail to do his duty or was the Captain lacking in approachability?

What was the RAF 'tradition' in the heavy world at the time regarding crew interaction, Ex-A? Was it one of 'gods' in the LHS or were they human? Did the 'heavies' have any concept of what is now called 'CRM'?

Never flew multi-crew - ie with a (crew) nav - in the RAF, but I trust that in the Phantom and Tornado force there was no such barrier? Fox3? Certainly in any 2-seat fast jet stuff I did the role of 'Captain' was always clearly and rigidly defined.

[Rwy in Sight]

For those who flew multi-crew militaryaircraft: how does it work* when the one who signs for the aircraft is more junior to the RHS? During the briefing before the mission the senior officer can use his rank but on-board is the hierarchy put on hold?

I am not sure if Boac's question is the same as mine. If it is kindly delete it!

*I don't know how to use the military ranks I am sure Ex-A would provide with a translation for me

[Boac]

I think a different question Ris. I have always thought the idea of having a specialist 'commander' (not 'Captain', since that has legal ramifications) in, say, a Nimrod tactical situation, was a sensible and logical idea, able to 'command' a particular manoeuvre but within the overall command' of the aircraft Captain and relegating the aircraft Captain to a 'driver airframe' role for the duration of that part of the mission with, however, the ultimate say in what happens to the aircraft and his crew. I have, of course, no experience of such operations but it is, however, an excellent example of 'Crew Resource' management.

Your question on 'rank' will, I'm sure. take us back to the 'royal' 146 in Islay

[Pontius Navigator]

RiS, the answer to your question was neatly encapsulated by one of my sqn cdrs. He was a nav and his captain was two ranks below him.

At crew -in the Captain might refuse the aircraft say for a worn tyre or a fuel leak. The flight is important. The sqn cdr orders him to proceed. "Yes Sir".

They board the aircraft whereupon the Captain declares is unservicable and they all disembark. The difference between command and captaincy. The same should be true between scheduler and captain in commercial aviation though the latter might need the backing from her union.

[Pontius Navigator]

BOAC, touching on your last post where we did have a captain and a commander. In the discussion the order to take off was given at the highest level with real risk of danger on return .

The aircraft Captain and pilot, said he would refuse the order. The Commander said he would have the Captain charged with dereliction of duty etc and get a more compliant pilot.

Never came to that though.

[Pontius Navigator]

BOAC, "why did the 'co' in post #25 not speak up and take control if necessary? Did he not know it was not authorised, fail to do his duty or was the Captain lacking in approachability?"

I can't answer the question as I was a last minute addition to the flight and did not know the personalities involved. Apart from rank I would guess that both pilots were equally experienced except that the Captain might have been the senior on-type instructor. After all the T* was a very new but and not long out of the paint shop.

I think other factors came in to play. IIRC the approach had been smooth without drama and the declaration of intention so late we were probably at decision height or lower. There was no time for discussion and it was probably safer to continue than to force an abort.

[Rwy in Sight]

RiS, the answer to your question was neatly encapsulated by one of my sqn cdrs. He was a nav and his captain was two ranks below him.

At crew -in the Captain might refuse the aircraft say for a worn tyre or a fuel leak. The flight is important. The sqn cdr orders him to proceed. "Yes Sir".

They board the aircraft whereupon the Captain declares is unservicable and they all disembark. The difference between command and captaincy. The same should be true between scheduler and captain in commercial aviation though the latter might need the backing from her union.

Boac and PN both many thanks. Loved that: "The difference between command and captaincy."

Boac then it seems local practice where the P3B have Air Force pilots in the cockpit and Navy officers at the back. My obvious question is then, whether a higher ranking officer can order an outranked AF pilot to perform a dangerous (aviation wise) manoeuvrer like flying close to a CB for a better detection of a submarine.

[Slasher]

In modern CRM the Captain is the boss and final decision maker. The Commander is the leader. The LHS in an ideal cockpit contains both.

IMG_7470.JPG (102.96 KiB) Viewed 320 times

[Boac]

whether a higher ranking officer can order an outranked AF pilot to perform a dangerous (aviation wise) manoeuvrer like flying close to a CB for a better detection of a submarine.

Since the 'pilot/s', under the present architecture, have 'control' over what the aircraft actually does, no. Subsequent disciplinary action is obviously possible - and may be correct, of course - and (rue the day) when an aircraft can be controlled from the rear stations so that the concierge can fly it................

[Pontius Navigator]

RiS,

My obvious question is then, whether a higher ranking officer can order an outranked AF pilot to perform a dangerous (aviation wise) manoeuvrer like flying close to a CB for a better detection of a submarine.

This was exactly what happened to us one night. The P1 was a very experienced RAF pilot, ex Gannet AEW, the Captain was a very experienced electronics officer, I was N1. We were at 20,000 feet over the Atlantic and were radio silent. We had made no radio calls from before take off and our radar was also off. Our nav lights were off and we were in cloud. We were had a hot goblin with a tight sonobuoy pattern around a Soviet submarine.

There was a massive bang. First thought, immediately after WTF was we had hit something. None of the kit went offline, we remained pressurised and the pilot confirmed no effect on handling and the engineer confirmed the two live engines were still fine (the other two had been routinely shut down).

The Captain asked P1 if was satisfied that the aircraft was still fully serviceable. He agreed it was and confirmed he was happy to continue. We did and were struck another 2-3 times. After about half an hour our submarine had moved from under the Cb and we continued to track it before going off task. We would not know until the next 'day' if our relief had continued to track it. They had.

We had obviously been at risk. Had acceptance of that risk been justified? What was the significance?

First was our pride. I can't recall whether we got the initial detection, I think we had. We were determined to hand it over to the next crew.

If we had abandoned our sortie the relief crew would have automatically recimmenced a search with the target being relocated in the next 8-12 hours but by another squadron or wing , or it would slip away.

Then the international dimension with the cousins finding what we had lost.

In the local picture it was hugely important. A little higher up the policy tree its importance diminished and in the context of a badly damaged or worse aircraft a risk we should never have taken.

In a tense situation we don't see the wood but only the tree. If could evidence this with examples, US, USSR, RN and even another of mine.

[Pontius Navigator]

. . . and (rue the day) when an aircraft can be controlled from the rear stations so that the concierge can fly it................

Oh but we did and that was 46 years ago. We were in the mid 40s heading for Tehran at o'dark hundred. Nice, quiet and warm in our costs little womb. I was dozing by the radar, the electronics officer in the other side was napping. Ahead and below our two chiefs in the black hole were sound asleep. Only the plotter in the back was beavering away. Approaching the turn point he gave the Captain the new heading. There was no reply. At the turn point he ordered the turn, nothing happened, so he simply dialled up the new heading on the nav's heading unit. The autopilot obediently followed the steer. He could not make and R T call and Tehran did not seem to notice.

[barkingmad]

Committing sacreligious act by using info from TOP to contribute to this thread.

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviatio ... 990-a.html

Posting #36 is probably the most informative.

As an ex-AEW Shack driver I knew some on board.

The sortie was allegedly the routine "handover" flight from outgoing squadron boss to the incoming boss. This usually involved a 'frame full of execs and the rest is tragic history.

http://www.ukserials.com/pdflosses/maas ... _wr965.pdf

Paragraph # 9 of this brief summation particularly relevant to this CRM thread.

As the son of a deceased crewmember has posted on TOP please be sensitive if commenting on this accident.

[Rwy in Sight]

We had obviously been at risk. Had acceptance of that risk been justified? What was the significance?

First was our pride. I can't recall whether we got the initial detection, I think we had. We were determined to hand it over to the next crew.

If we had abandoned our sortie the relief crew would have automatically recimmenced a search with the target being relocated in the next 8-12 hours but by another squadron or wing , or it would slip away.

Then the international dimension with the cousins finding what we had lost.

In the local picture it was hugely important. A little higher up the policy tree its importance diminished and in the context of a badly damaged or worse aircraft a risk we should never have taken.

In a tense situation we don't see the wood but only the tree. If could evidence this with examples, US, USSR, RN and even another of mine.

That sounds a bit like a civilian crew using discretion to work beyond the maximum duty time. As long as thinks don't turn south, a good outcome unlike the one on TOP thread.

[Pontius Navigator]

As an ex-AEW Shack driver I knew some on board.

The sortie was allegedly the routine "handover" flight from outgoing squadron boss to the incoming boss. This usually involved a 'frame full of execs and the rest is tragic history.

AFAIK it was just a routine sortie and not a hand over flight. The 2nd Wg Cdr was OC Ops and just on board for the flight. The sqn cdr had been our copilot on Nimrods and later my flt cdr on 8.

I have always kept my thoughts private.

[Pontius Navigator]

Regarding use of an AEW radar for land avoidance, I had a similar experience with ASV on Nimrods.

During the 2nd Cod War we were creeping along the 12 mile limit looking for Icelandic gunboats. As Nav it was my task to keep us the right side of the limit. The procedure was for the radar operator to try and identify a bit of rock, mark it on the ASV, and transmit it to the Routine Dynamic Display. I would then slew the display light to hopefully the same bit of rock. I would then watch my nav light to make sure it was the right side of the line.

To tighten this up I drew a chinagraph line on my protractor to mark the 12 miles, gave it to the radar operator and said check with this.

The Captain said I couldn't pass navigational clearance to an NCO. I gave him a stiff ignoring as it was clearly a whichever and more accurate check. Of course I still carried on with the standard procedure.