AS350 Ditches in East River, New York

[FD2]

FAA Emergency Order:

4910-13
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 91
[Docket No. FAA-2018-0243]

“Doors-off” and “Open-door” Flight Prohibition: Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notification of Emergency Order of Prohibition.

SUMMARY: This notification provides Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-0243, issued March 22, 2018 to all operators and pilots of flights for compensation or hire with the doors open or removed in the United States or using aircraft registered in the United States for doors off flights. The Emergency Order prohibits the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems that cannot be released quickly in an emergency in doors off flight operations. It also prohibits passenger-carrying doors off flight operations unless the passengers are at all times properly secured using FAA-approved restraints.

DATES: The Emergency Order of Prohibition is effective March 22, 2018.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jodi Baker, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Safety Standards, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington D.C. 20591; telephone: 202-267-3747; e-mail: Jodi.L.Baker@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The full text of Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-0243, issued March 22, 2018 is as follows:
This Emergency Order of Prohibition is issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40113(a) and 46105(c). This Order is effective immediately. This order is issued to all operators and pilots of flights for compensation or hire with the doors open or removed (hereinafter, “doors off flights” or “doors off flight operations”) in the United States or using aircraft registered in the United States for doors off flights. This Order prohibits the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems (as defined below) that cannot be released quickly in an emergency in doors off flight operations. This Order also prohibits passenger-carrying doors off flight operations unless the passengers are at all times properly secured using FAA-approved restraints.

Upon information derived from investigation into a March 11, 2018, helicopter accident on the East River near New York City, New York, the Acting Administrator has found that an emergency exists related to aviation safety and safety in air commerce and requires immediate action. For more detailed information, see “Background/Basis for Order,” below.

SCOPE AND EFFECT OF THIS ORDER
This order applies to all persons (including, but not limited to, pilots) conducting doors off flights for compensation or hire in the United States or using aircraft registered in the United States to conduct such operations. “Operate,” as defined in 14 CFR 1.1, means to “use, cause to use or authorize to use” an aircraft, including the piloting of an aircraft, with or without right of legal control.
Supplemental passenger restraint systems, such as the harness system used by the operator of the helicopter involved in the March 11, 2018, accident, can significantly delay or prevent passengers from exiting the aircraft in an emergency. Effective immediately, the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems in doors off flight operations for compensation or hire is prohibited. The term “supplemental passenger restraint system” means any passenger restraint that is not installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA approval, including (but not limited to) restraints approved through a Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, or as an approved major alteration using FAA Form 337.

Persons may operate doors off flights for compensation or hire involving supplemental passenger restraint systems if the Acting Administrator has determined that the restraints to be used can be quickly released by a passenger with minimal difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft in an emergency. The ability of a passenger to quickly release the restraint with minimal difficulty must be inherent to the supplemental passenger restraint system. A supplemental passenger restraint system must not require the use of a knife to cut the restraint, the use of any other additional tool, or the assistance of any other person. A supplemental passenger restraint also must not require passenger training beyond what would be provided in a pre-flight briefing.

Applications for a determination as to whether a supplemental passenger restraint system can be quickly released by a passenger with minimal difficulty may be submitted to the FAA Aircraft Certification Service, Policy and Innovation Division, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Ft. Worth, Texas 76177, Attention: Jorge Castillo, Manager (email: Jorge.R.Castillo@faa.gov; tel: 817-222-5110).

The applicant bears the burden of clearly and convincingly demonstrating that the supplemental passenger restraint system can be quickly released by a passenger with minimal difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft in an emergency. In reviewing any such application, the FAA shall consider the design, manufacture, installation, and operation of the supplemental passenger restraint system.

Further, effective immediately, passenger-carrying doors off flight operations for compensation or hire are prohibited unless the passengers are at all times properly using FAA- approved restraints, such as at all times occupying an approved seat or berth and properly securedwith a safety belt and, if installed, a harness; or at all times secured by an FAA-approved supplemental passenger restraint system.

The prohibitions in this Order shall not be construed as authorizing doors off flight operations without supplemental passenger restraint systems. The operator of a doors off flight remains responsible for ensuring the safety of the aircraft and the passengers on board, and otherwise complying with all statutes, regulations, and safety standards concerning the flight. AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION
The FAA Administrator is required to promote the safe flight of civil aircraft by, among other things, prescribing minimum standards for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5).

The FAA Administrator has authority to take necessary and appropriate actions to carry out his aviation safety duties and powers under part A (“Air Commerce and Safety”) of subtitle VII of Title 49 of the United States Code, including conducting investigations, issuing orders, and prescribing regulations, standards, and procedures. 49 U.S.C. 40113(a). When the Administrator determines that an emergency exists related to safety in air commerce and requires immediate action, the Administrator may issue immediately effective orders to meet the emergency. 49 U.S.C. 46105(c).

BACKGROUND/BASIS FOR ORDER
Based on an initial investigation and the reliable and credible evidence presently available, the Acting Administrator finds that:

On March 11, 2018, civil aircraft N350LH, an Airbus Helicopters AS350B2 helicopter, was operated “doors off” on a flight in the vicinity of New York City, New York. All passengers on the flight wore harness systems that allowed the passengers to move securely within the helicopter and sit in the door sill while airborne. The harness systems were provided by the operator to ensure passengers did not fall out of the helicopter while moving around. Along with the supplemental passenger restraint systems, the operator provided knives to be used to cut through the restraints if necessary, and informed the passengers of the purpose of the knives.

During the flight, the aircraft experienced a loss of power, resulting in the aircraft impacting the East River. The aircraft subsequently rolled over, and all of the passengers perished. The supplemental passenger restraint systems worn by the passengers, while intended as a safety measure when the aircraft was in flight, may have prevented the passengers’ quick egress from the aircraft.
While the fatalities on March 11, 2018, involved an aircraft impacting the water, passengers could face a similar hazard in other emergency situations, such as an aircraft fire on the ground.

Under 49 U.S.C. 46105(c) the Acting Administrator has determined that an emergency exists related to safety in air commerce. This determination is based on the threat to passenger safety presented by the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems not approved by the FAA, which may prevent a passenger from exiting the aircraft quickly in an emergency. Accordingly, this Order is effective immediately.

DURATION
This Order remains in effect until the issuance of an applicable FAA order rescinding or modifying this Order. The Administrator will issue a rescission order when there is a change in an applicable statute or federal regulation that supersedes the requirements of this Order, or the Administrator otherwise determines that the prohibitions prescribed above are no longer necessary to address an emergency in air safety or air commerce.


While this Order remains in effect, the FAA intends to initiate a rulemaking that addresses operations using supplemental passenger restraint systems that have not been approved by the FAA.

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS ORDER
Any person failing to comply with this Order is subject to a civil penalty for each flight on which they are found to be in violation. See 49 U.S.C. 46302(a). Small business concerns and individuals (other than persons serving as an airman) are subject to a civil penalty of up to $13,066 per flight. See 49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(5)(A)(ii); 14 CFR 13.301. Other entities are subject to a civil penalty of up to $32,666 per flight. See 49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(1)(B); 14 CFR 13.301. A person serving as an airman on a flight operated in violation of this Order is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,437 per flight or a certificate action, up to and including revocation. See 49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(1)(B), 44709(b)(1)(A); 14 CFR 13.301. An air carrier or commercial operator violating this Order is subject to certificate action, up to and including revocation. See id. Air tour operators and other persons are subject to the rescission of any FAA-issued waiver or letter of authorization. Any person failing to comply with this Order may be subject to a cease and desist order or a civil action in a United States district court to ensure compliance. See 49 U.S.C. 44103(a), 46106.

RIGHT TO REVIEW
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 46110(a), a person with a substantial interest in this order “may apply for review of the order by filing a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United States in the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place of business.” The petition must be filed within 60 days after the date of this order. 49 U.S.C. 46110(a).


EMERGENCY CONTACT OFFICIAL
Direct any questions concerning this Emergency Order of Prohibition, to Jodi Baker, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Safety Standards, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington D.C. 20591 (email: Jodi.L.Baker@faa.gov; Tel: 202-267- 3747).

[FD2]

From the preliminary NTSB report:

...As the helicopter neared the eastern boundary of Central Park, the pilot slowed the helicopter to between 20 and 30 knots groundspeed so the passengers could take photographs. At this point, he noticed that the front passenger's restraint was hanging from the seat. He picked it up, tapped the passenger, and told him to put it back on, which he did. During the interview the pilot also recalled that other passengers had inadvertently released their seatbelts during previous flights.

As they were flying along the eastern side of Central Park, the front seat passenger turned sideways, slid across the double bench seat toward the pilot, leaned back, and extended his feet to take a photograph of his feet outside the helicopter. As the pilot initiated a right pedal turn to begin to head south, the nose of the helicopter began to turn right faster than he expected, and he heard a low rotor rpm alert in his headset. He then observed engine pressure and fuel pressure warning lights and believed he had experienced an engine failure. He lowered the collective pitch control to maintain rotor rpm and let the nose continue to turn to the right. Central Park came into view and he briefly considered landing there but thought there were "too many people." He continued the turn back toward the East River and made his first distress call to air traffic control. He yelled to the passengers to get back in their seats. Due to the helicopter's airspeed, he was not sure he could make it to the East River and reduced rotor rpm so he could "glide better." Once he was in an established autorotative glide, he attempted to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. He waited 1 or 2 seconds and tried the starter again, but there were no positive indications of a successful engine restart on the instrumentation. He checked the fuel control lever and found that it was still in its detent for normal operation. When he was sure he could clear the buildings and make it to the river, he activated the floats at an altitude of about 800 ft agl.

At this point he was "committed to impact," and, when he reached down for the emergency fuel shutoff lever, he realized that it was in the off position. He also noted that a portion of the front seat passenger's tether was underneath the lever.

As the helicopter continued to descend through 600 ft agl, he positioned the fuel shutoff lever to the "on" position and attempted to restart the engine. He observed positive indications on the engine instruments immediately. As the helicopter descended through 300 ft, he realized that the engine "wasn't spooling up fast enough," and, given the helicopter's proximity to the surface, he had to continue the autorotation. He again reached for the fuel shutoff lever and positioned it back to "off." Passing through between 100 and 50 ft, he began the cyclic flare in an extended glide configuration, but he "did not get a lot of rpm back." He performed a flare reduction at 10 to 15 ft. He pulled the collective pitch control up "as far as it would go." The helicopter then impacted the water at 5° to 10° nose-up attitude.

After impacting the water, the chin bubble on the pilot's side began to fill with water, which quickly covered the floor. He kept his restraint on and reached down for the front seat passenger's carabiner attachment to the helicopter. He turned the knurled screw "two or three rotations"; by that time, the helicopter was "listing past a 45° roll." He then decided to egress the helicopter, and by the time he unbuckled his restraint, he was fully under water. He used two hands to grab the door frame and pull himself out. He surfaced about 4 ft away from the nose of the helicopter and crawled up onto the belly. He stood up and waved for help but could not see anything.

[CharlieOneSix]

That's the stuff of nightmares! I have a not dissimilar story of an object fouling a vital control but it involved me and another pilot - no pax. I think I've posted the story before - hopefully elsewhere and not on this forum. Back in February 1980 I had been tasked with putting a large grating onto the roof of a sister company's new engine test facility at Prestwick. It was a totally unnecessary task as a small crane could easily have done it but there was good media publicity to be had for the engine test facility. T and I departed our Shoreham base and I used the transit to train T, who was new to the type, for his initial Instrument Rating. Our Bolkow 105 was fitted with an instrument flying screen in front of the right seat pilot. It was held in place in fixtures either side of the cockpit frame with pip pins and the bar and screen could be rotated down in front of the trainee. We didn't carry enough fuel for an IFR arrival and alternate as I wanted to arrive with minimum fuel plus 15 minutes for the lifting job so we maintained VFR.

All went well until we crossed the Solway Firth when the weather deteriorated. We could still arrive VFR at Prestwick so I called a halt to the IR training so we could concentrate on the weather and asked T to descend to around 1000ft. T suggested we remove the instrument screen contraption as even with it rotated upwards it impeded his view somewhat and we could move it to the pax seats behind us. I took control whilst T removed his pip pin and he did likewise whilst I removed mine with the plan that I took the weight as it came free. The trouble was that although my pin came out, the bar would not free itself from the fitting on the fuselage frame. No autopilot was fitted so T put the cyclic between his knees and we both gave the screen assembly a mighty heave. Now on the Bolkow 105 the speed selects (throttles) are in the roof panel. The screen assembly came free with a jolt and travelled rearwards far enough to snap both speed selects to their idle stops. Fortunately T remembered that I would take the weight of the screens - he lowered the collective to minimum, entered autorotation and then moved the speed selects fully forward and recovered to cruise flight.

That of course wasn't the only time I could say that "I learned about flying from that".......and I did CHIRP it some time later so others weren't so stupid!

prestwick lift.jpg (155.3 KiB) Viewed 511 times

[FD2]

The latest from the New York Times:

Months Before Deadly Crash, Helicopter Pilots Warned of Safety Issues

All five passengers were killed when a tourist helicopter crashed into the East River on March 11. The pilot was the lone survivor of the crash, which has focused scrutiny on the company that operates the flights.

CreditBebeto Matthews/Associated Press

By Kenneth P. Vogel and Patrick McGeehan

April 7, 2018
For months before an open-sided helicopter capsized in the East River, drowning five passengers who had been strapped inside, pilots for the company that operated the flight warned their bosses about dangerous conditions, including equipment that could make escape difficult.

The pilots repeatedly requested more suitable safety gear, with one pilot writing in an email to company management that “we are setting ourselves up for failure” by using sometimes poorly fitting harnesses. That pilot made a series of recommendations — including one four days before the fatal accident — for new tools that would allow passengers to more easily free themselves in case of an emergency, according to company emails, other internal documents and interviews.

The internal documents reviewed by The New York Times indicate that executives for the company, FlyNYON, bristled at the pilots’ concerns, insisting that the operation, which offered the chance to snap selfies while leaning out over the city, was safe.

“Let me be clear, this isn’t a safety issue with the harnesses,” Patrick K. Day, the chief executive of FlyNYON, said in a January email exchange with pilots who had raised concerns.

Mr. Day, in a statement to The Times, rejected the idea “that anyone at FlyNYON did not heed issues raised by pilots at Liberty Helicopter” — an affiliated company that owned and operated the helicopters used in FlyNYON flights — “and that we failed to respond to safety concerns.”

Less than two months after the email exchange, on March 11, a FlyNYON flight splashed in the East River after losing power and quickly rolled over, trapping its pilot and five passengers upside down in the frigid water.

The passengers were outfitted with some of the equipment that the pilots had raised concerns about — yellow harnesses connected to tethers that strapped them into the copter, and small cutters to slice through the tethers so they could free themselves in an emergency. The pilot, Richard Vance, was the only one who was not wearing such a harness; he used a standard seatbelt and was the sole survivor.

Mr. Vance told federal investigators that he tried to free the passenger beside him, but the helicopter was submerged before he could finish unhooking the man’s harness, according to a preliminary report.

Surging Business

The internal documents, and interviews with people familiar with FlyNYON’s operation and Mr. Vance’s account, paint a portrait of a company that at times appeared to put business concerns ahead of safety concerns as it scrambled to meet surging demand for a daring form of aerial tourism that it pioneered.

While government regulations and professional standards had not kept pace, the company claimed on its website that it had developed a proprietary safety system that was the class of the industry. In fact, the documents and interviews show that FlyNYON had been using mostly off-the-shelf construction harnesses that it had planned to upgrade — and that sometimes were supplemented by zip ties and blue painters tape — and tethers that could not be easily severed by the cutters provided.

The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating the crash. The Federal Aviation Administration, which had not previously specifically regulated doors-off helicopter flights, has banned any flights that use restraints that passengers cannot quickly get out of, a prohibition aimed squarely at FlyNYON.

Multiple pilots who have worked with FlyNYON and Liberty Helicopters — including the pilot who warned of the harnesses in the email — are seeking whistle-blower protections in order to speak out. They have retained a Washington lawyer who specializes in whistle-blower matters, Debra Katz. She has asked the New York attorney general’s office to investigate FlyNYON, and she sent a letter to the F.A.A., claiming that the pilots were subject to retaliation.

As a result, she wrote, “there is a pervasive feeling among Liberty pilots that if they provide truthful information to the F.A.A. and the N.T.S.B. and speak out about the lax safety culture and practices at FlyNYON, they will face blackballing in the industry and other forms of career-derailing retaliation.”

The New York attorney general’s office has begun a consumer-protection investigation into FlyNYON’s business practices and demanded that the company cease promoting doors-off flights, according to a person who had been briefed on the investigation.

Mr. Day, in his statement to The Times, pointed out that the F.A.A. had performed a site inspection of FlyNYON’s facility on Oct. 31, at which “inspectors observed the harness and tethering process and continued to permit their use on Liberty and FlyNYON operated flights without issue.”

The F.A.A. confirmed that it conducted “routine oversight” of Liberty’s operations on Oct. 31 and “observed supplemental harnesses outside a helicopter.” But a spokesman for the agency said that its inspectors would not have rendered judgment on the harnesses because supplemental restraints are not subject to inspection. Liberty Helicopters declined to comment.

[FD2]

There's a lot more here:

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/n ... e=Homepage

[TheGreenGoblin]

The NTSB says doors-off helicopter flights where passengers are secured with safety harnesses should stop. This recommendation comes after reviewing the March 2018 accident where five passengers perished in New York’s East River and includes the board urging the FAA to close a loophole that allows such flights under the guise of aerial photography.
“These companies were knowingly exploiting a loophole to avoid stronger regulation and oversight and people died because of it,” said NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt. “These types of doors-off flights with dangerous supplemental restraints that could get tangled or caught on something and hamper escape ought to stop before others get hurt.”

Full report...

[G~Man]

There are bigger issues in the report than this. Namely:


Need for guidance and procedures for operators to assess and address passenger intoxication. Although the passenger in the front seat on the accident flight was intoxicated, it was not possible to determine whether alcohol played a role in his inadvertent activation of the FSOL. Despite the existence of an FAA regulation prohibiting the carriage of any passenger who appears to be intoxicated or impaired, neither Liberty nor NYONair had any documented policy or guidance materials, including training, for their employees to identify impaired passengers or for denying boarding of such individuals. While FAA guidance does exist on identifying intoxicated or impaired passengers, operators that conduct revenue passenger-carrying flights under Part 91 or 135 in small aircraft could benefit from guidance specific to their operations, particularly if they have passengers seated in close proximity to the aircraft controls.

And

Through their repeated lack of involvement in key decisions related to Liberty Helicopters-operated FlyNYON flights, Liberty’s managers allowed NYONair personnel, particularly NYONair’s chief executive officer, to influence core aspects of the operational control of those flights.

Most of the issues raised are part of a larger discussion by the HAI sponsored Rotorcraft Safety Working Group. As some know, I am a member of the 20 person group---along with some pretty senior NTSB and FAA personnel. We re meeting for 2 days next week in DC to review and provide the recommendations to the FAA. If anyone has any ideas......speak now or forever hold your piece.

[TheGreenGoblin]

Both the sky dive and helicopter outfits at an airfield of my acquaintance have placards warning passengers and would be jumpers not to drink alcohol before their flights. How one might enforce that is another thing altogether.

It is a tricky area and where does a commercial outfit draw the line? If a passenger does not appear intoxicated then they are likely to get a flight due to the need for a steady revenue stream!

What are the FARS relevant to alcohol and helicopter passengers in the US? Can an operator insist on testing a passenger and is there a set passenger alcohol limit?

[G~Man]

What are the FARS relevant to alcohol and helicopter passengers in the US? Can an operator insist on testing a passenger and is there a set passenger alcohol limit?

For the pilot, I believe no drinking within 50' & no smoking within 8 hours........

I digest. 14 CFR 91.17(b) applies. ( See Here )

(b) Except in an emergency, no pilot of a civil aircraft may allow a person who appears to be intoxicated or who demonstrates by manner or physical indications that the individual is under the influence of drugs (except a medical patient under proper care) to be carried in that aircraft.

This brings up a legal conundrum, in that it is up to the staff of a company to determine if someone is intoxicated or not. Most have a placard that states words to the effect that they reserve the right to deny boarding to passengers who "appear intoxicated". I have had to refuse passengers a few times, and allow them to sober up---especially flying people back and forth from Coachella Music Festival.

That then brings up another issue.....drugs. I used to be DO for a company that has the exclusive rights to fly helicopters to Catalina Island. An Island resident wanted to open a "Cannabis Dispensary" on the island. Perfectly legal under California law. The local "powers that be", (kind of like a council), did not want it on their island. There was a meeting of the "minds" of which I was a part, (god only knows why... ), and it was decided to give him a city business license. He neglected to check all the rules........How was he going to get his product to the Island? The water channel is under federal control----it is illegal to have ANY narcotics on board a vessel, the FAA controls aircraft and again, illegal to transport any narcotics, and as we all know you cannot mail it. So, there is a dispensary on Catalina that the authorities are waiting for it to open so they can arrest the guy for transporting narcotics illegally in the federal system.

[TheGreenGoblin]

Gob