Seabed Warfare Part 1

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Seabed Warfare Part 1

#1 Post by TheGreenAnger » Wed Oct 05, 2022 2:16 pm

The recent attacks against the Nordstream pipelines in the Baltic Sea have, once again, focused NATO on the strategic vulnerability of its members seabed assets, such as gas pipelines and internet cables etc. and raises some difficult questions as to how best to protect them.


Undersea data cables are critical to the internet upon which the modern world has come to depend. This hidden network forms the backbone of global communications but is surprisingly vulnerable to interference by hostile actors. Protecting this infrastructure may become an increasingly important remit for the Royal Navy.

Background
The first undersea cables were telegraph cables laid by Britain to maintain communication across its empire in the second half of the 19th Century. Telegraph cables were gradually replaced by telephone cables and in the 1980s fibre optic technology revolutionised the volume of data that could be carried by a single cable. As the internet revolution began, this fibre optic cable network expanded and new cables continue to be laid across the globe. At least 97% of all internet and voice data now passes through this network.

A data cable is typically about the same circumference as a garden hose for most of its length, although sections closer to shore have thicker sheathing, are buried in trenches cut below the seabed or even have mating laid over them for protection. Specialist cable laying ships are employed and keep to carefully planned and surveyed routes, avoiding natural obstacles such as reefs, wrecks, sharp drops and inclines and areas of known seismic activity. Besides intentional damage, cables have been accidentally cut by ship’s anchors, fishing activities and have even been attacked by sharks. Laying submarine cables is expensive and time-consuming, demanding the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars before a return is made. To date, more than 1.2 million km of submarine cables have been laid in the oceans of the world, the longest single cable is the Asia-America Gateway (AAG) cable system which runs for over 20,000 km. A typical modern subsea cable is made up of up to 200 fibres, each able to transmit 400Gb of data per second in both directions.

Interference with submarine cables for strategic ends began in earnest during the First World War when Britain cut Germany’s undersea telegraph cables in the English Channel. The single remaining German cable was tapped by Britain allowing it to read messages. In response, the Germans attempted to destroy allied cables and signal stations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean with limited success. Most of this sabotage did not require sophisticated equipment and was usually done in relatively shallow waters by surface vessel using grappling hooks. However German U-boat, U-151 was fitted with a cutting device and in 1918 managed to sever links between New York and Nova Scotia and New York and Panama. The practice of cable cutting continued in all theatres during the Second World War.

The Cold War inspired a new level of submarine cable interference. The most well-known example is operation ‘Ivy Bells’. The US Navy used SSNs adapted with diver lockout chambers to lay cable tapping devices on Soviet cables that linked the Russian naval base at Petropavlovsk to its mainland headquarters in Vladivostok. The devices recorded conversations on magnetic tapes that were recovered and replaced by regular submarine operations. Between 1971-81, when the tap was revealed to the Russians by a US mole, the recordings provided valuable intelligence and insight into Soviet naval planning. This may have been the tip of the iceberg as the USN likely conducted other tapping operations. In the modern era, Edward Snowden (Heroic privacy rights campaigner/Putin’s useful idiot) revealed to the media that the American NSA and British GCHQ are able to harvest vast amounts of internet data from taps placed both legally or covertly on fibre optic cables all over the world.
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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 2

#2 Post by TheGreenAnger » Wed Oct 05, 2022 2:27 pm

The Russian threat
Cutting submarine cables is a deniable activity that would suit a power like Russia that my try to achieve its ends operating in the ‘grey zone’ below the threshold for full-scale war. This kind of asymmetric attack is attractive for a ‘weaker power’, the activity is low risk and for a relatively modest investment and could potentially achieve enormous impact. Russia is dependent on the internet but the Western economies would be much more exposed to loss of connectivity. The UK has been particularly successful in developing its digital economy, even amongst other developed nations and would be especially harmed by a loss of internet access.

Russia is investing in sophisticated naval assets that could be employed to cut specific cables in a targeted and covert way. Submersible with arms that can manipulate objects on the sea bed can place taps, cut cables or leave devices that could cut cables upon command in the future. The research ship Yantar is officially classed as Auxiliary General Oceanographic Research (AGOR), with underwater rescue capability. She is tasked by the shadowy GUGI (Main Directorate Deep-Sea Research) which is an arm of the Russian Defence Ministry but separate from the Navy. Yantar has been seen operating close to seabed cables on several occasions by open-source intelligence analysts and is doubtless tracked much more closely by professional naval intelligence. There is no evidence of nefarious activities yet but Yantar has likely been primarily engaged in information gathering, charting the location and vulnerabilities of cables and other undersea energy infrastructure should they wish to interfere with them in the future.

The US maintains a secretive underwater network of sensors (Formerly SOSUS, now known as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)) used to track submarine activity. IUSS is increasingly mobile and less reliant on fixed infrastructure but it does still exist and adversaries remain interested in the location of the sensor arrays and supporting cables. As part of its attempts to dominate the Arctic, Russia is known to be laying its own network of arrays under the ice called HARMONY. Incredibly, the system is believed to be powered by a series of small submarine-portable nuclear reactors laid on the seabed.

The construction of such a complicated system is only possible because GUGI operates the largest fleet of covert manned submersibles in the world. This fleet includes six nuclear-powered mini-submarines; 2 x Paltus (730 tons) 3, x Kashalot (1,580 tons) and Losharik (2,100 tons). Supporting them are two large ‘mother’ submarines that can covertly convey their deep-diving babies over long ranges. Although the construction of HARMONY may be the initial task, this transporter submarine capability means the Russians can potentially interfere with submarine cables unseen anywhere in the world’s oceans.

Securing the lines
Protecting cables that stretch for thousands of miles across the deep ocean floor is extremely challenging and potentially expensive but there are three main ways in which security could be improved.

Legal and regulatory. There is limited protection for submarine cables in international law and this could be addressed with a new International treaty with punitive sanctions against any nation proven to have interfered with cables. This would at least help raise the threshold of risk for actors contemplating such action. Cable Protection Zones could also be implemented in areas of shallower waters where vital cables at risk. Areas covered by these regulations would not allow, surface ships conducting ‘research activity’, fishing, ships anchoring or diving. Even assuming all nations would be willing to accept a new treaty, like all regulation of the marine environment, the primary difficulty is to ensure round the clock enforcement.

Capacity and redundancy. Key data traffic routes could be backed up by redundant extra ‘dark’ cables, ideally not marked on charts and buried as much as possible. There is already some redundancy in the system as accidental cable breaks occur frequently but there is limited financial incentive to invest large numbers of new cables, capable of providing the level of resilience required if a concerted attack cut multiple connections. Building this additional resilience would likely require government funding in partnership with cable companies.

Surveillance and deterrence. It is possible that cables could be fitted with sensors that can detect the sonar frequencies used by submersibles intent on interference and alert authorities ashore. It may also be possible to use fibre optic cables themselves as sensors. Small or unusual movements in the cable caused by interference may be detectable by analysing the transmission of light through the cable. There are already research programmes underway to investigate using undersea cables to measure distant seismic activity.

New developments make the deployment of a fleet of UUVs to patrol up and down sections of cable practical and affordable. Persistent Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (PAUV) that use very little power and are can operate independently for several months are maturing and could be a solution. The deployment of patrol UUVs and the inspection and rapid repair of submarine cables could be a task for the new Ocean Surveillance/Research Vessels. This activity cannot be undertaken by the UK alone and would require co-operation with other nations willing to invest significantly in cable security.

The RAF recently stood up a new ‘Space Command’ with its mission to “protect the UK’s interests in space”. Loss of satellite links would severely hamper military command and control systems, communications and ISR in particular, but cutting a few seabed cables has the potential to cause damage measured in hundreds of £Billions and affect every aspect of society. The ability to disrupt satellites is limited to a few powerful nations but the bar to disruption of seabed infrastructure is much lower and more easily achieved. Part of the tasking for the newly established NATO North Atlantic Command (based in Norfolk, Virginia) is to monitor threats against undersea infrastructure – the nearest organisation (or ‘Inner Space Command’) currently in existence to address an arguably greater threat.

Unlike the nuclear or cruise missile threat, specific deterrence against data cable interference cannot be maintained with the option to respond in kind. All that can be done is to make it riskier for adversaries to contemplate by improved regulation and surveillance. In broader terms, further improvements in anti-submarine and underwater warfare capability for the RN and across NATO is needed. Small steps such as the new RVs and the procurement of the Manta XLUUV technology demonstrator are moves in the right direction but there is much more to be done to secure the backbone of global communications.

https://www.navylookout.com/the-threat- ... ea-cables/
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Re: Seabed Warfare

#3 Post by TheGreenAnger » Wed Oct 05, 2022 2:47 pm

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Cui Bono?

#4 Post by Undried Plum » Wed Oct 05, 2022 8:43 pm

Certainly not the Russians. They stand to lose many hundreds of billions of Dollars/Euros/Roubles of revenue from the destruction of those pipelines. Certainly not any of the North European countries either. They all have massively great big gas prices to pay now that the cheap and plentiful gas from Russia is not available..

The notion that Russia somehow strapped explosive devices, mines in effect, to the pipeline as it was being laid is just idiotic. The devices would have to be attached right at the end of the firing line, after the tight annulus of the X-ray machine and after the tension machine. Such devices would be highly conspicuous to everyone on the barge. Also remember that laybarges are attended by a fleet of anchor-cranker tugs which continually lift and re-lay the ten anchors that pull the barge along and keep it on the planned track of the layline. Then there's the Survey vessel which usually does the touchdown monitoring and later the as-laid survey. Too many hundreds of pairs of eyes watching the pipe go down the stinger to keep that sort of thing secret for more than half a dogwatch.

Another idiotic conspiracy theory being touted by the 77th Brigade and Integrity Initiative mob is similarly implausible. They are trying to plant the propaganda idea that mebbe the pesky Russians pumped the explosive charges along the pipelines in pigs (a cylindrical piston which separates air from gas and measures various parameters in routine internal inspections). That's totally crazy because when they were pigging and pressure testing the lines last year there was no suggestion that anyone was going to sabotage the lines or shut them down. Those pigs would 100% for sure fetch up in the pig traps at the shoreside destination terminal and would be noticed!

The most probable suspect is the country which stands to benefit by having a captive market for their fracked gas at monstrously inflated prices. Y'know, the country which overtly threatened to destroy Nordstream 2 if Russian forces went to the aid of the Russian people of the Donbas who were systematically being massacred by the US-supported fascist paramilitaries.

Demolition charges could quite easily be set either by SEAL divers locked out of a manned sub, or else by ROV or even AUV. It's not a technically difficult challenge to do something like that covertly. It's done all the time to place intercept devices on telecomm cables and to place demolition charges on SOSUS-style hydrophones and their associated cablework.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#5 Post by Undried Plum » Wed Oct 05, 2022 9:56 pm

Something which I should have mentioned earlier is that although we talk about Nord Stream 1 & 2, there are actually four pipelines.

Only three were bombed. The fourth is completely unscathed. I guess the demolition charge on that one failed for some reason.

It's a 48" line which operates at 300 Bar, so it could supply vast amounts of very cheap gas if Germany could just tell the Septics to take a flying jump.

The huge price increase of gas is entirely self-inflicted.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#6 Post by Undried Plum » Thu Oct 06, 2022 12:56 pm

Joe Biden wasn't bluffing or blustering when he said that the US would "bring an end" to Nord Stream 2.




"There will be no longer a Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it."

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#7 Post by TheGreenAnger » Fri Oct 07, 2022 9:46 am

Cui bono?

One German perspective...

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#8 Post by Boac » Fri Oct 07, 2022 3:08 pm

Ignorant question:
When pipeline like that is run across international waters, who would oversee and undertake the construction of it? The originators - Russia/The end consumer - Europe?

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#9 Post by Undried Plum » Fri Oct 07, 2022 7:07 pm

The originators.

It's done under international law.

Other than, and including the UN, there is no international policeman.

Not even the godalmighty US of A.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#10 Post by Undried Plum » Fri Oct 07, 2022 7:12 pm

Thanks for the vid, TGA.

I don't know what area of his expertise may be, but he clearly knows the square root of bogall about pipelines.

The concrete weight coating is applied with extreme care and for obvious reasons there is an obsessive attention to QA and to QC for every linear centimeter that is applied. If that stuff ever comes off, you've got a hugely long buoy bobbing and buckling and cracking up with 4,500psig of natural gas waiting for the first opportunity to escape make mischief . In many pipelines the laid pipe is then covered with a thick layer of rock armour to stabilise the pipeline on a shifting seabed but also to provide overtrawlability protection too. The weightcoating has to deal with the impact of thousands of tonnes of large rocks of granite without flaking off when the string of rock is being dropped from hundreds of feet above. On unburied pipelines it also needs to be able to withstand the impact of 2-tonne trawl boards at five or six knots without falling to bits

Getting an explosive device large enough to punch a hole through a couple of inches of very high quality steel, together with its attendant acoustic modem transducer and powerpack and electronics, into the concrete weight coating without being detected by the QC guys is a quite literally fantastical project. To do so four times would be difficult to the power of four. Even Tom Clancy would not come up with such a silly plot as he knows that his publishers would laugh him out of the building.

His odd fixation on the fact that there are thousands of tonnes of munitions dumped on the seabed suggests to me that he doesn't know a damn thing of which he speaks.

In the piperoute selection process we ALWAYS do very high resolution route surveys to identify such obstructions and we either change the route or remove the obstruction long before the laybarge comes over the horizon. The fact that the specialist contractors (I used to be one back in the days when I worked for a living) switch effortlessly back and forth between working for government agencies and major construction firms is not at all sinister. That's just the way it works. No military (even the US or RF) is so self-contained that they can replicate civilian expertise in such specialised fields to any great quantitative extent and effect.

As for his surprise that ENI has an Italian government interest, what can I say? That acronym stands for Energetico Nazionale Italia. Duh! There should have been a bit of a clue for him in the name, I would have thought. Their pet engineering prime contractor Snamprogetti, which also has a six-titted wolf (of Romulus and Remus) as its logo, as does their subsidiary subcontractor Saipem who owns Castoro Sei which laid most of the pipelines.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#11 Post by Undried Plum » Fri Oct 07, 2022 7:44 pm

Added to #9: I should add that there are usually insurance interests involved.

When there are billions of investments at stake, often funded by debt which is often backed by insurance, there will often be side-bets by re-insurers.

They, for understandable reasons, usually have client representatives present at all stages of such pipeline projects.

I can promise you of that, for several reasons.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#12 Post by Boac » Fri Oct 07, 2022 7:56 pm

Brilliant! What a lot I learnt!

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#13 Post by Undried Plum » Fri Oct 07, 2022 8:41 pm

Boac wrote:
Fri Oct 07, 2022 7:56 pm
You are most gracious, M'Lud.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#14 Post by TheGreenAnger » Sat Oct 08, 2022 2:43 am

Undried Plum wrote:
Fri Oct 07, 2022 7:44 pm
Added to #9: I should add that there are usually insurance interests involved.

When there are billions of investments at stake, often funded by debt which is often backed by insurance, there will often be side-bets by re-insurers.

They, for understandable reasons, usually have client representatives present at all stages of such pipeline projects.

I can promise you of that, for several reasons.
After the Berlin wall had come down and the Soviet "Onion" had collapsed, I worked on a collateralized lending system (IT system design don't you know) to allow mark to market analysis of outstanding loan liability against collateral (in multiple currencies, financial instruments, giving a present net value of assets held in the collateral pool including pipelines, plant and even wine held in a bonded warehouse) on a multi-billion-dollar collateralized loan made by a consortium of banks headed up by Chase Manhattan as a part of a rotating loan facility to Gazprom. The system we designed had the ability to make calls on asset substitutions etc. to manage the collateralized/outstanding liability ratio in real time. The programme gave me a fairly good insight into how such ventures work and are funded, and yes part of the risk analysis inherent in doing such analysis included the risk of sabotage, by whatever actor, and it was regarded as technically feasible, but unlikely at that time.

Now, IMHO, in the current unhinged and febrile atmosphere that pertains in the Russian gas market, I think, it is highly likely that Moscow is the malign actor in the case of these explosions in/on the pipelines, not least to be able to trigger clauses in contracts that justify the lack of service delivery and thus the cessation of payments of outstanding interest, midst plausible deniability, while also sending a strong warning message to Europe and NATO. American banks have too much skin in the game to want this still outstanding debt to go down the pan. I really don't believe the USA is responsible for those explosions.
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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#15 Post by Undried Plum » Sat Oct 08, 2022 10:57 am

When asked in a press conference how he would bring Nord Stream to an end, the President of the US said "“We will – I promise you – be able to do it”.

He was as good as his word, on that occasion.

Nord Stream 1 ran out of puff because both of the compressor turbines at the Russian end were tired and shagged out. They were down to one when the second one went phutt. It wasn't resting. It wasn't stunned. It was bleeding demised. That turbine is no more. It has passed on. It has ceased to be. It hasn't gone to meet its maker. It's a late turbine. It's a stiff. It is bereft of life. It rests in pieces. It has run down the curtain and it has joined the choir invisible. It has kicked the bucket. It is an ex-turbine.

The first one was undergoing a complete refurb in a NATO country at the time of the US/NATO war against Russia kicked off bigtime early this year and so it was withheld from return to its Russia for obvious reasons.

Nord Stream 2 was completely match fit and good to go, but was disabled by Germany for political reasons. Nothing physical prevented Germany from paying its bills and opening the taps at their end.

If a gas customer shuts off the valve at their end of the supply line, or if that customer declines to pay their bills, you cannot reasonably claim that the supplier is in default.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#16 Post by TheGreenAnger » Sat Oct 08, 2022 11:32 am

Undried Plum wrote:
Sat Oct 08, 2022 10:57 am
When asked in a press conference how he would bring Nord Stream to an end, the President of the US said "“We will – I promise you – be able to do it”.

He was as good as his word, on that occasion.

Nord Stream 1 ran out of puff because both of the compressor turbines at the Russian end were tired and shagged out. They were down to one when the second one went phutt. It wasn't resting. It wasn't stunned. It was bleeding demised. That turbine is no more. It has passed on. It has ceased to be. It hasn't gone to meet its maker. It's a late turbine. It's a stiff. It is bereft of life. It rests in pieces. It has run down the curtain and it has joined the choir invisible. It has kicked the bucket. It is an ex-turbine.

The first one was undergoing a complete refurb in a NATO country at the time of the US/NATO war against Russia kicked off bigtime early this year and so it was withheld from return to its Russia for obvious reasons.

Nord Stream 2 was completely match fit and good to go, but was disabled by Germany for political reasons. Nothing physical prevented Germany from paying its bills and opening the taps at their end.

If a gas customer shuts off the valve at their end of the supply line, or if that customer declines to pay their bills, you cannot reasonably claim that the supplier is in default.
Another day, another theory, I guess.
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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#17 Post by Undried Plum » Sat Oct 08, 2022 11:39 am

Here's a "theory" for you.

Radoslaw Sikorski, a Bullingdon Club chum of Bonkers Boris who went on to become Foreign Minister of Poland and quite certainly knows how things work within NATO, tweeted just after the American bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines: "Thankyou USA" as a caption of a picture of the gas bubblepatch emanating from one of the bursts.

https://t.co/nALlYQ1Crb

Image

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#18 Post by TheGreenAnger » Sat Oct 08, 2022 11:45 am

Undried Plum wrote:
Sat Oct 08, 2022 11:39 am
Here's a "theory" for you.

Radoslaw Sikorski, a Bullingdon Club chum of Bonkers Boris who went on to become Foreign Minister of Poland and quite certainly knows how things work within NATO, tweeted just after the American bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines: "Thankyou USA" as a caption of a picture of the gas bubblepatch emanating from one of the bursts.

https://t.co/nALlYQ1Crb
No doubt the USA has the ability to hit these pipelines, but their motive was less imperative than that of Russia's. As I say, I very much doubt that the US did this, but I guess we will have to wait for further investigation before any empirical evidence either way is delivered.

Whatever the case the huge release of gas should be construed as an ecological disaster.

https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88062
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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#19 Post by Undried Plum » Sat Oct 08, 2022 11:49 am

Russia had no motive to destroy their own pipelines.

They were a source of immense wealth for Russia.

The US couldn't give a flying hockeypuck about emanation of greenhouse gasses.

We will quite certainly never be given empirical evidence about the truth of the bombings.

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Re: Seabed Warfare Part 1

#20 Post by TheGreenAnger » Sat Oct 08, 2022 11:55 am

The scale of the operation—the multiple sites and amount of explosives involved—suggests the involvement of a state. Despite initial speculation that the attack could have been the work of non-state actors, that seems highly unlikely. Given reported drone sightings near oil and gas platforms in the North Sea in recent months, European and U.S. officials and energy companies have every reason to be worried about what Moscow is up to. Certainly, there will be very close inspection of global flight tracking services and MarineTraffic data by both professionals and amateurs looking for possible culprits. The Baltic Sea is a busy place, of course, but it can be assumed that governments, military units, and companies are already pooling their information.

Some commentators have already leaped to self-serving conclusions that simply raise eyebrows. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, for example, claimed that the attacks occurred in “countries that are completed controlled by the U.S. intelligence services.” Fox News television personality Tucker Carlson also implied a U.S. role in the explosions. “If you are Vladimir Putin, you would have to be a suicidal moron to blow up your own energy pipeline,” Carlson argued. “That’s the one thing you would never do.”

The explosions are clearly rattling Western governments that are already on edge following Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling in a September 21 address to the nation. The current state of energy flows in Europe, however, was not directly impacted, nor is there any immediate economic effect. That is because Nord Stream stopped operating at the beginning of September following gradual supply reductions during the summer, whereas Nord Stream 2, despite containing gas, was never launched. Europe was not counting on the resumption of supplies by this route any time soon, and the pipelines were in any event doomed to lose their value in coming years as Europe moves to procure its gas from anywhere other than Russia. In strictly economic and commercial terms, this case might be the equivalent of the traditional potlatch ceremony held by Native Americans, a spectacular destruction of a dysfunctional piece of infrastructure with little residual value.

The attack may, however, have signaling value. If so, that does change the strategic landscape in the energy war. If perpetrated by Russia, the signaling value toward the West—which would certainly know Russia is behind the explosions—may be a threat to the rest of the marine energy infrastructure. Back in 2021, Putin told a gathering of military leaders: " If our Western colleagues continue the obviously aggressive stance, we will take appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures and react harshly to unfriendly steps. I want to emphasize that we have every right to do so." Was the Nord Stream attack a hint that similar mishaps might happen to some or all of the seven major pipelines delivering Norwegian gas to the UK and continental Europe? The explosions coincided with the inauguration of the Baltic Pipe taking Norwegian gas to Poland, so this is hardly an academic hypothesis.

One irony of the attack is that Russia’s Gazprom potentially stands to benefit: it will no longer need to invent excuses not to supply Europe via Nord Stream 1. Now it can claim a force majeure, which will dramatically reduce the risk of compensation claims for non-delivered volumes. This logic, however, does not explain the damage caused to Nord Stream 2. On the other hand, the Nord Stream consortium companies and eventually Gazprom might even hope to collect some insurance for the damaged pipelines. Given that they already looked set to become a stranded asset, that would be far from the worst outcome for the giant company.
https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88062
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