Don't touch it until I say "Now"
Posted: Sun Oct 20, 2019 4:47 pm
Another story, does this man never know when to shut up !!!
At some time during your career as a Vulcan co-pilot you may have been invited to take part in an ICC which I believe stood for Intermediate Captain's Course but I am not sure about that, it was just ICC. My invitation was presented in '71 I think. It's in my logbook.
Traditionally the Captain flies from the left seat of the aircraft, the Co-pilot from the right seat. The plan of the ICC was that you would fly with an instructor and be checked out in the left seat of the aircraft which, of course, is the Captain's seat, henceforth, with a properly authorised real Captain you could fly the aircraft on a regular sortie from the left seat. This almost never happened because there were very few right hand seat qualified Captains. No doubt as part of this course you were assessed to determine your suitability for a Captain's seat on your next tour.
When I carried out my ICC I was extremely fortunate to get Squadron Leader Joe L'Estrange as my instructor. Joe was widely acknowledged to be the most experienced Vulcan instructor in the RAF. He had apparently been flying Vulcans since they were introduced and he had a long list of other types he had flown such as the Meteor, Vampire and Mosquito. I liked Joe a lot, he was a total hoot to fly with and a marvellous instructor of the "I'll let you get yourself into trouble and then I will show you how to get out of it" type. I think he talked to the aircraft like some people are supposed to be able to whisper to horses.
Since the ICC was supposed to cover all Captain duties they were flown as regular sorties but with a little more time than usual being used for handling exercises.
Towards the end of one of my ICC flights we entered the circuit only to be told that the runway had just been blocked by a Lightning with a blown tyre. It would take about 15 minutes to clear the runway. We made a low pass to see what was going on and, sure enough, there was a Lightning parked at just about the centre of the 9000 foot runway. The aircraft was on the runway centreline but it was at an angle to this. Air Traffic told us we were the only aircraft in the pattern so we could tootle off to the location we preferred and wait.
After the estimated 15 minutes we were informed that the situation was worse than expected,. The Lightning's burst tyre was caused by a seized brake which would have to be removed, another 20 minutes or so.
When we arrived in the circuit we had enough fuel for quite a number of approaches but we were beginning to use this fuel up so we started watching the gauges. Unfortunately, due to unusual local circumstances we were committed to landing at this airfield. I noticed that Joe did not seem particularly concerned about anything.
Now we need to digress to a lecture on the Vulcan fuel system because this becomes relevant. The Vulcan had 14 fuel tanks, 7 on either side of the aircraft centreline. The #1 tanks were in the fuselage to the rear of the cockpit, the other tanks were in the wings. Each tank had its own fuel pump and a push-button that bought up a quite accurate fuel quantity indication on a left or right gauge. You could see the fuel in any individual tank by simply pushing its button so the pilots had a pretty good indication of fuel on board. Unfortunately the rear crew members only had a total fuel quantity gauge which hovered around zero when the fuel was getting a little low making them pretty nervous. The low fuel procedure was to burn off the fuel in all of the tanks from #2 to #6 and keep as much fuel as possible in tanks #1 and #7. You could not move fuel out of tanks #2 to #6 you could only burn it out but tanks #1 and #7 were special because they were connected together by fuel lines and a couple of high capacity fuel pumps. Moving fuel between tanks #1 and #7 was used to adjust the CofG of the aircraft because, as we all know, it had no tailplane. This was, in fact, the same concept as used by Concord to adjust its CofG except I believe the Concord system was automatic. I saw Joe start to burn off the wing tank fuel.
The fuel quantity was beginning to become a concern when the final shoe fell. ATC called to report that other problems had been found with the Lightning, apparently the wheel axle was seized somehow and a repair could not be completed on the runway, the aircraft would have to be towed clear. A tug and lifting device were on the way but they could only travel at about 3mph so it was going to be 20 minutes before the lifting device would arrive and some time after that before the runway was clear. I was intrigued to note that Joe was still completely unfazed. We were now down to fuel in the #1 tanks only, perhaps enough for another 3 or 4 visual patterns, certainly not enough for another 20 minute plus delay.
I was working the radio as Joe flew. "Tell them that we are landing off our next approach and that they should get all personnel off the runway.". I passed this message on and got a simple "Roger, understood". ATC knew what the game was. I could imagine an arm reaching for the crash button, the fire engines would be rolling shortly.
Now Joe turned to me "We will be a little slower than normal on the final approach, don't worry about it, it's OK. I will be flaring at what will seem to be a little bit in the undershoot, don't worry about it. it's OK. I will put the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible and then go for maximum braking, don't worry about it, at this light weight it is OK. Now, here is where I need your help." Great I thought, otherwise I was just going to be a nervous passenger. "Put your hand near the brake chute switch on short final but don't touch it until I say "Now" then do not hesitate. As soon as I say now stream the chute, we will still be in the air but don't worry about it, it's OK." Nice to see I did not have much to do but I hoped Joe would get his timing right because when that chute deployed we were going to drop out of the air like a brick. If he called for the chute too early we would drop into the undershoot, probably break the landing gear legs off on the lip at the end of the runway and cartwheel down the runway on fire as a finale.
Finals turn, three green lights, low and a little slow on finals as briefed, rather flat approach, unusually high power setting. Threshold coming up, NOW, I moved the switch. It takes the parachute a time to deploy and just as the wheels touched the ground we felt the chute bite. Brakes on. We probably could have stopped in 3500 feet. Joe moved over to the edge of the runway and we dumped the chute. We rolled down the runway a little to take a look at the Lightning and then we made a 180 on the runway to return to our dispersal. No body said a word, nothing from the rear crew nothing from ATC. I looked over at Joe and said "Nice job", he had dropped his mask so I could see his grin. He said "Don't try that yourself until we have practiced it a couple of times."
I like to think that Joe added this sequence to his flying display because of this experience, see around 7:51 on this video. At this display he does flare a little further down the runway than we did, on the other hand there is no Lightning parked ahead of him this time.
.
At some time during your career as a Vulcan co-pilot you may have been invited to take part in an ICC which I believe stood for Intermediate Captain's Course but I am not sure about that, it was just ICC. My invitation was presented in '71 I think. It's in my logbook.
Traditionally the Captain flies from the left seat of the aircraft, the Co-pilot from the right seat. The plan of the ICC was that you would fly with an instructor and be checked out in the left seat of the aircraft which, of course, is the Captain's seat, henceforth, with a properly authorised real Captain you could fly the aircraft on a regular sortie from the left seat. This almost never happened because there were very few right hand seat qualified Captains. No doubt as part of this course you were assessed to determine your suitability for a Captain's seat on your next tour.
When I carried out my ICC I was extremely fortunate to get Squadron Leader Joe L'Estrange as my instructor. Joe was widely acknowledged to be the most experienced Vulcan instructor in the RAF. He had apparently been flying Vulcans since they were introduced and he had a long list of other types he had flown such as the Meteor, Vampire and Mosquito. I liked Joe a lot, he was a total hoot to fly with and a marvellous instructor of the "I'll let you get yourself into trouble and then I will show you how to get out of it" type. I think he talked to the aircraft like some people are supposed to be able to whisper to horses.
Since the ICC was supposed to cover all Captain duties they were flown as regular sorties but with a little more time than usual being used for handling exercises.
Towards the end of one of my ICC flights we entered the circuit only to be told that the runway had just been blocked by a Lightning with a blown tyre. It would take about 15 minutes to clear the runway. We made a low pass to see what was going on and, sure enough, there was a Lightning parked at just about the centre of the 9000 foot runway. The aircraft was on the runway centreline but it was at an angle to this. Air Traffic told us we were the only aircraft in the pattern so we could tootle off to the location we preferred and wait.
After the estimated 15 minutes we were informed that the situation was worse than expected,. The Lightning's burst tyre was caused by a seized brake which would have to be removed, another 20 minutes or so.
When we arrived in the circuit we had enough fuel for quite a number of approaches but we were beginning to use this fuel up so we started watching the gauges. Unfortunately, due to unusual local circumstances we were committed to landing at this airfield. I noticed that Joe did not seem particularly concerned about anything.
Now we need to digress to a lecture on the Vulcan fuel system because this becomes relevant. The Vulcan had 14 fuel tanks, 7 on either side of the aircraft centreline. The #1 tanks were in the fuselage to the rear of the cockpit, the other tanks were in the wings. Each tank had its own fuel pump and a push-button that bought up a quite accurate fuel quantity indication on a left or right gauge. You could see the fuel in any individual tank by simply pushing its button so the pilots had a pretty good indication of fuel on board. Unfortunately the rear crew members only had a total fuel quantity gauge which hovered around zero when the fuel was getting a little low making them pretty nervous. The low fuel procedure was to burn off the fuel in all of the tanks from #2 to #6 and keep as much fuel as possible in tanks #1 and #7. You could not move fuel out of tanks #2 to #6 you could only burn it out but tanks #1 and #7 were special because they were connected together by fuel lines and a couple of high capacity fuel pumps. Moving fuel between tanks #1 and #7 was used to adjust the CofG of the aircraft because, as we all know, it had no tailplane. This was, in fact, the same concept as used by Concord to adjust its CofG except I believe the Concord system was automatic. I saw Joe start to burn off the wing tank fuel.
The fuel quantity was beginning to become a concern when the final shoe fell. ATC called to report that other problems had been found with the Lightning, apparently the wheel axle was seized somehow and a repair could not be completed on the runway, the aircraft would have to be towed clear. A tug and lifting device were on the way but they could only travel at about 3mph so it was going to be 20 minutes before the lifting device would arrive and some time after that before the runway was clear. I was intrigued to note that Joe was still completely unfazed. We were now down to fuel in the #1 tanks only, perhaps enough for another 3 or 4 visual patterns, certainly not enough for another 20 minute plus delay.
I was working the radio as Joe flew. "Tell them that we are landing off our next approach and that they should get all personnel off the runway.". I passed this message on and got a simple "Roger, understood". ATC knew what the game was. I could imagine an arm reaching for the crash button, the fire engines would be rolling shortly.
Now Joe turned to me "We will be a little slower than normal on the final approach, don't worry about it, it's OK. I will be flaring at what will seem to be a little bit in the undershoot, don't worry about it. it's OK. I will put the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible and then go for maximum braking, don't worry about it, at this light weight it is OK. Now, here is where I need your help." Great I thought, otherwise I was just going to be a nervous passenger. "Put your hand near the brake chute switch on short final but don't touch it until I say "Now" then do not hesitate. As soon as I say now stream the chute, we will still be in the air but don't worry about it, it's OK." Nice to see I did not have much to do but I hoped Joe would get his timing right because when that chute deployed we were going to drop out of the air like a brick. If he called for the chute too early we would drop into the undershoot, probably break the landing gear legs off on the lip at the end of the runway and cartwheel down the runway on fire as a finale.
Finals turn, three green lights, low and a little slow on finals as briefed, rather flat approach, unusually high power setting. Threshold coming up, NOW, I moved the switch. It takes the parachute a time to deploy and just as the wheels touched the ground we felt the chute bite. Brakes on. We probably could have stopped in 3500 feet. Joe moved over to the edge of the runway and we dumped the chute. We rolled down the runway a little to take a look at the Lightning and then we made a 180 on the runway to return to our dispersal. No body said a word, nothing from the rear crew nothing from ATC. I looked over at Joe and said "Nice job", he had dropped his mask so I could see his grin. He said "Don't try that yourself until we have practiced it a couple of times."
I like to think that Joe added this sequence to his flying display because of this experience, see around 7:51 on this video. At this display he does flare a little further down the runway than we did, on the other hand there is no Lightning parked ahead of him this time.
.