The Doomsday Machine.

[AtomKraft]

If the worst happened Ben, you wouldn't have prevailed.

Nobody would have prevailed.

Why won't the US abandon its 'no first use policy'?

China did in 1964- and holds to it til this day.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

The second of my links gives the background on why it is in China's interest, and not in the US/NATO interest, to abandon first use. Essentially, China has massive personnel superiority and no interest in attacking the US. It also has a lot of land to yield initially. However, NATO must defend against massive personnel inferiority, and has minimal/no land to trade for time in European war.

[AtomKraft]

Fox.
I doubt the US would even shoot in the event say, Romania was bombed.

And most US citizens dont even know that they are committed to an all out nuclear war- 'nuclear combat, toe to toe with the Russkis', and therefore to utter annihilation, in the event of a minor shooting war in Europe.

But it is so. Officially, anyway.

Pick up a copy of Ellsbergs book if you get a chance.

[AtomKraft]

Btw Fox, the real reason the US won't abandon its First use' policy, is because it intends to use its nukes to threaten- and has made such threats many times.

Also, because it may well launch on warning, which is first use.

Farther, it's commitment to first use, effectively neuters all worldwide plans to disarm.

It has little to do with the tactical situation in Europe.

[BenThere]

I contest your assertion that the US has threatened first use many times. Can you cite a single instance?

[AtomKraft]

Sure Ben.
1. Deployment of 'atomic capable' B-29s to the UK and Germany during the Berlin blockade.

2. Trumans press conference on 30 Nov 1950 warning that they were considering nuking North Korea.

3. Ikes' secret threats against China in 1953, to force a settlement in Korea.

4. Dulles' offer to nuke Vietnam in 54 to relieve the French at Dien Bien Phu.

5. During the quemoy crisis in 54-55.

6. Diplomatic threats to deter the Soviets during Suez.

7. During the Lebanon crisis of 1958 to stop Iraq going into Kuwait

8.during the second Quemoy crisis, in 58, again to stop China.

9. During the Berlin crisis of 58-59

10. During the next Berlin crisis of 1961-2

11. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962- DEFCON 2

12. Numerous 'shows of nuclear force' after Cuba

13. During Khe Sanh, LBJ discussed publicly the use of nukes to avoid defeat.

I could go on, but there's really no doubt about it.

North Vietnam alone claims they were threatened with nukes thirteen times.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I'm not sure I follow your argument, Atomkraft.
The US has simply stated, in response to questions, that nuclear weapon use is always a consideration, and the examples you list are during wartime or de facto wars. It's simply a restatement of what has always been US policy. 'Threatening' doesn't really have any descriptive value during wartime. It's also worth considering that the US has not used nukes since 1945, despite several situations where their use would have been militarily effective, and indeed where the US military had told the President so.

[John Hill]

F3WMB if you want to dismiss Atom's list as being in times of war or de facto war I have to wonder if the US has ever threatened nuclear use against people who were not their enemies.

[BenThere]

I suppose that the threat of first use is implicit when nuclear weapon possession and capability to deliver are apparent. While I was thinking in terms of a comply or else demand, you were bunching up instances where the topic was mentioned, but never seriously considered with the possible exception of the Korean War where MacArthur thought it plausible but was thwarted by President Truman.

Fox3 makes a good point that US restraint from after WWII ended to the present includes about a decade when the US had a monopoly on the beast.

What other great power in the history of mankind has had such an advantage and declined to use it to its aggrandizing? Give us a little bit of credit in that regard even though it might cause you some ideological pain. Pax Americana has kept the world free of total war for over 70 years now. Show some respect. When our Atlas Shrugs, which I am tending to advocate, watch out!

[Undried Plum]

What other great power in the history of mankind has had such an advantage and declined to use it to its aggrandizing?

You gotta be kidding!

They couldn't wait to incinerate two cities worth of people with those two weapons.

The Japanese were ready to surrender, but their two demands: for retention of the Emperor; and retention of the Imperial Rising Sun flag on their naval ships, were a useful way for the attackers to stall while the weapons were prepped and fitted to the aircraft.

Three cities had been kept relatively unscathed so that the civil populace could be used as a vast open air vivisection laboratory full of human guineapigs.

The objective of using the world's worst terrorist weapon wasn't to terrorise the Japanese. It was to terrorise the Russians. The somewhat arrogant presumption was that the Russians didn't have the brains or the money to build such weapons themselves and that The Empire would dominate the world unchallenged thenceforth.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

The Japanese were ready to surrender

But they didn't, did they?

Ready to surrender, the war was nearly over, etc, is all post hoc reasoning. It's only over when they DO surrender, and every commander, ruler, diplomat, soldier, and politician has known that since the beginning of Time. There are only two states - surrendered or not. In fact, Japanese troops had pretended to surrender an awful lot of times, then shot the troops taking that surrender. It was not a war for taking chances.

[BenThere]

President Truman's decision was colored by the experienced cost in blood at the battle for Okinawa. The prospect of conquering Japan in a land war was daunting for a nation extremely tired of war in 1945.

Most responsible accounts credit the use of two nuclear weapons for saving perhaps millions of lives, both American and Japanese, by ending the war. The effect on the Russians and their post-war ambitions was a bonus, but secondary to the main objective of ending World War II.

[Slasher]

The Japanese were ready to surrender

But they didn't, did they?

Ready to surrender, the war was nearly over, etc, is all post hoc reasoning. It's only over when they DO surrender, and every commander, ruler, diplomat, soldier, and politician has known that since the beginning of Time. There are only two states - surrendered or not. In fact, Japanese troops had pretended to surrender an awful lot of times, then shot the troops taking that surrender. It was not a war for taking chances.

+1

While the average Nip at home may've wanted to surrender the govt elite didn't. The Kempai Tai brutally ensured no one spoke of surrender, even after a B29 raid over TYO snuffed an estimated 90,000 locals due to the heavy bombing causing resultant massive firestorms. The elites had their deep bunkers to retreat to. As in all wars the aggressor leadership doesn't give a sh!t about its own people.

After Hiro and Naga those elites realised they couldn't escape from a nuking and there just wasn't enough time to build deep enough subterranean reinforced cells. The Yanks had only two nukes at the time but the Japs didn't know that. So...possibly believing TYO was next on the hit list...they surrendered. The thing is is took TWO bombs to get the little bastards to come around.

If I had lived during that time in America - or elsewhere that was under Japanese brutal rule - I wouldn't have cared a rats arse how the buggers were defeated nor how many of 'em were taken out in the process. The main thing is the war ended.

On 5th August 1945 how would you've really felt if you received orders that you were to be on the first landing barge on Honshu? And how relieved would you've felt after the nukes forced the Jap surrender? If each island in the Pacific took the sacrifice of many thousands of US soldiers, think how many would've died invading the Rising Sun homeland itself. I've heard at least a million+ US corpses. And don't forget the Japs fought to the last man just to keep a pissy little Pacific island.

[AtomKraft]

Well guys, this thread is about a book.
It's an excellent read and written by a guy who worked for RAND during a period when RAND were employed by the USAF.
The USAF asked RAND to investigate command and control over their own nuclear weapons, and the author had 'go anywhere, ask anything, see everything' access.

I think it's fair to say that he knows what he's on about.

There is no doubt that the US has threatened to use its nukes on many occasions, and if you don't believe me, read this book and learn something.

As far as the controversial decision to bomb Hiroshima and Kokura goes (Nagasaki was the alternate) there was no decision to make. As Slasher mentioned, they were already full on with the policy of burning civilians.

Although the book is mainly about nukes, it goes into the rationale behind conventional bombing of civilians quite thoroughly in chapters entitled 'Bombing cities' and 'Burning cities'.

[ian16th]

My brother in law, who was an infantryman fighting in the mud in Burma, with the Green Howard's, tells of being very happy with the news of the dropping of the 2 nukes.

[k3k3]

Likewise my father, he was in the RN and involved with liberating POW camps on isolated islands.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

..as indeed does our local WW2 Vet, who was about to sail for the Invasion of Japan.

Atomkraft, I am grateful for the book recommendation. It seems to offer some insight into what was going on within the US planning system in the 1960s, and I may get around to reading it for that. As for the conclusions and stance of the author, I am in disagreement. From the foreword, the author states he was wholly against the execution of a plan that would result in 600 million dead. However, the Japanese plan for the defence of the Home Islands was proudly proclaimed 'The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million', and the American planners expected around half a million dead soldiers and 10 million dead Japanese. Compared with these figures, the death of a quarter of a million (top estimate) in the atomic bombings of H & N was the best option for minimising suffering. Essentially, the US, British and French abilities and willingness to cause mass nuclear destruction was what kept the Cold War cold. My view is that all totalitarian leaderships are composed of psychopaths - Soviet Russia, Communist China, etc. The only language they understand is their own death, so that is what they must believe will happen if they start anything. If that means 600 million will die along with them, then so be it. Personally, I would like to see a lot more effort on targeting leaderships rather than cities.
A bigger modern problem is the use of nuclear devices by muslim extremists. Many of these guys do not give a stuff about their own death, and so planners in every country are convinced they will use a device as soon as they get one. This causes me a lot more concern than the nuclear arsenals of major powers.

[AtomKraft]

The Atom bombs brought the war to an end, and who wouldn't be happy about that?

The end was important, the means less so.

And as Slasher hinted, bollocks to the nips. They didn't need to start it.

The bombs sent a coded warning to the Russkis, We have this. Dont feck with us.

That the US continues to threaten with nukes is a secret, but it's a kind of thinly disguised one.
Those threatened know it. But it's never public.

[AtomKraft]

Fox.
I have you at a bit of a disadvantage because I've read this, and you haven't.
It's not about the atomic bombing of Japan, although it does go into the conventional bombing of both Germany and Japan in some depth.

It's more concerned with the creation of doomsday weapons on both sides of the Cold War, and that no war aim can entitle either side to create such a weapon.

Until you can find a copy, and I bought mine at the airport, so it must be widely available, try a little online research about the Russians 'Perimiter' or 'Dead Hand' system.

That'll give you a better idea. I expect as a former 'cold warrior' you'd find this as book as fascinating as this one did.

Edit to add after reading your post again: No, targeting the enemies command and control isn't wise. If you knock all that out, how are they going to stop? Decapitating strikes, hoping to ensure no retaliation, have been predicted, and measures put in place to ensure they won't work.
In fact, the author was an advocate of a 'no cities' policy, with enemy cities effectively held ransom, although I don't think his policy was adopted.
And why wouldn't someone object to a policy that would kill 600 million? Only a loony would support it!
For example, the SIOP of the time favoured the destruction of China, even if the attack came only from Russia!
It's a startling read.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

The purpose of a decapitating strike capability is not primarily to win the war, it's to stop the war starting by ensuring the opposition leaders know they will die.
The reason for supporting a '600 million death' plan is because the alternative is worse. Support does not imply enthusiasm.
The initial SIOP did include China as they were seen as part of a Communist Bloc, including Soviet Russia and its satellites. Given the supply of nuclear technology from the USSR to China, and China's involvement in the Korean War, this was not unreasonable.

The longer term psychology of total war also interests me. Within countries that have democracy now, such as Germany and Japan, is there an identifiable tendency of the people not to choose bellicose leaders based on the knowledge of the destruction of cities? Also, if there is a pacifist tendency, has this perhaps overcompensated and contributed to ineffectiveness in defence of national interests? The pointlessness of the German contribution in Afghanistan springs to mind. The horrors of the First World War, almost exclusively inflicted on soldiers, do not seem to have prevented the Second, so is mass civilian death necessary to prevent the next war, whatever one feels about it being unavoidable in winning the current one. At what level of risk do a national people, or individuals, choose to rebel against a totalitarian regime? We have already mentioned the unreliability of NSWP forces as a factor in Soviet war planning. We are getting at the basics of human nature here, and the psychology of crime and punishment would appear to have many parallels with civilian thinking about total war.