I'm going to be very busy for the next six months, so will be posting quite a bit less.
I thought I'd have a look at how 2024 is likely to go.
ISW yesterday
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... ch-21-2024
Mashovets’ assessment is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian defense production is capable of sustaining the current tempo of Russian offensive operations but is unlikely to be able to fully support a potential operational or strategic-level mission in 2024.
So the Russians are restricted to what they can grab with their current superiority in ammo supply and troops.
The process of flattening each settlement in turn, then sending in the 'meat waves' will continue. It's what the Russians know, and it's keeping putin and the senior leadership off the generals' backs.
Russia will win a war of attrition if it can maintain its current advantages without losing elsewhere.
At this rate, it will take till the year 2697 to reach Kyiv, but putin doesn't care.
Russia is suffering significantly economically, but it's not going to cause internal dissent for a couple of years at least.
He's betting on the support from Ukraine's allies waning first. This can happen in three ways.
The first is changes in western leadership attitude, the big ones being the USA, then the UK. Trump in particular appears much less inclined to continue supporting Ukraine as much.
The second is economics, with the western governments less able to support Ukraine because of increasing internal economic woes.
The third is higher priorities elsewhere, such as Israel/Hamas.
This is what the Russians are working on.
Personally, I think this is Russia's best bet, because I think the West will be economically screwed quite soon under current policies and politicians.
So I think the Ukrainians have to win it by this Fall if they are going to avoid having to concede current territory to Russia in a peace deal.
I think the Ukrainian leadership thinks this too.
Can they do it?
Firstly, there's the political side. Much depends on what the Ukrainian leadership wants to do, and what the western political leaders allow them to.
The big question, I think, is 'Are assaults directly into Russia on the cards?' If so, to what extent?
On the military side, does Syrskyi have the strategic nous to plan and lead a dynamic sequence of assaults to break the Russians elsewhere than the minefields of the main front line?
Well, he's more dynamic than Zaluznyi, but is he just a butcher who'll sacrifice a horde of guys to gain 17 square feet back, as the negatives say he is?
On this, and the same questions about the senior leadership of the Ukrainian army, depend the operational side of the summer's attacks.
On the tactical side, the Ukes have said themselves frequently that Senior NCOs are the key. Do they have enough good ones yet? They haven't had long to change the Soviet military culture.
There's always the logistical side. Will the Ukes have enough equipment, ammo and supplies to sustain whatever summer assaults they have planned?
For that to happen, the western promises have to be turned into actual stuff arriving at the Ukrainian border on time in sufficient quantity. This hasn't happened so far in most areas.
Secondly, the Ukes have to sort out their own corruption and inefficiencies so that the stuff, both from the West and from internal production, actually gets to the front line troops on time in sufficient quantity.
And thirdly, will those troops use the stuff intelligently and economically?
There is the technical side. If Ukraine can generate war-winning weaponry in sufficient quantities, the Russian equation may change.
Can they take down the Kerch bridges?
Can they flatten half the oil refineries? (Update: That didn't last long!) blow up most of the Russian railway system often enough?, take out enough Russian bombers on the ground?
I don't know. They've put the Russian Navy back in its box, and there are hints they can do all the above on a small scale.
The problem with innovation is you can't guarantee it will happen.
I don't know the answers to any of these. I doubt anyone does at this stage.
However, I do think these are the key points and questions, and that the answers are in the balance.
One cannot say definitely no or yes to anything at the moment.
And of course Probes' last post shows the problem of Ukraine being dependent on western support, and thus western politics.
If the oil price goes through the roof, Biden loses the election.
On the plus side, if Biden doesn't come through with the promised/necessary support, they can restart the refinery strikes tomorrow.
Additionally, putin now knows how he can affect the result of the US Election, simply by changing Russian oil prices and/or supply.
What's the betting there's a big "technical" problem with Russian oil supply in, say, August?
putin and Trump don't have to be in cahoots for this to happen. Could just be that putin prefers Trump in power for what he will naturally do.
One awaits developments. Personally I think the Ukes should concentrate on the Kerch bridge and Russian railways. Those shouldn't affect the oil price much.
but they have plenty anyway!). Glide bombs on both sides of the border.
. Engels being right next to a bend in the Volga would provide quite good opportunities for final position checks by various means.