ET crash ADD NBO

[Slasher]

Would you believe Boac even the B738 sim instructors here dunno either?

Referring to the 450ft you mentioned earlier, 400ft of course is the minimum legal height for second segment start. However most outfits I've found have policy anywhere between 800-1500ft even for EFATO.

It is common knowledge that fuel burn can be reduced all engines by cleaning up and accelerating as early as possible - and that's been known by low cost mobs for a long time. Therefore the flap lever in UP detent speculation has some sway.

[Undried Plum]

Does a Max pitch down when flaps are being raised?

Does the damned MCAS take that into account?

Does the Ethiopian Max sim simulate all aspects of the behaviour of the MCAS. Had their sim destructors been taught the details of the programming of the giblets of the MCAS box?

[Boac]

Slasher - not surprised!

I would hazard a guess (as per post #352) that it would be F1, and IF it is driven by lever position it is quite conceivable MCAS could have kicked in at 450'. Otherwise, as I posted, the height gain would have been more.

You really don't have much in your favour at 450' with trim malfunction, stick shaker and instrument warnings by the dozen. It looks a little bit as if the Chump's AMAZING record on 'aviation safety' (as bull-sh!tted) has come home to roost - 357 unfortunate folk later.

[Boac]

This excellent video has come up on YouTube. Any 737 pilots who watch it, like me, will have disturbed sleep for a few nights. It is frightening.

It shows the effect of the increasing airspeed on the difficulty in moving the manual trim wheel. I can recall in the dim and distant past a sim exercise with DanAir where a similar situation arose and it required BOTH pilots to exert effort on the trim wheel to move it (that is why the handles on the wheels are offset between left and right). Imagine now the situation you see in this video where the handling pilot is using all his strength to hold the nose up - with BOTH hands?

The only fault I can see in the video is why they spent time showing how difficult it is to trim the nose DOWN?

However, NB they reached 340kts in this demo following the unreliable airspeed drill (!).

Watch it and bleed. RIP the passengers and crew in Lion and ET. Don't forget we also think both crews had stick shaker at the same time.

[barkingmad]

Even worse, imagine if this system went haywire whilst the other pilot is in the khazi with trousers around his/her ankles (presumably alone!)?

I wonder if the aircraft designers consider this in their deliberations or do they assume the perfectly constituted crew at all times?

[Wodrick]

From my G/E experience I concur this is really hard and I found the angles wrong. The 727 drill (same airline) was for the F/E to stand astride the pedestal and crank away with both hands, it's easier then. Not really a 737 option though.

[Boac]

Video now 'unavailable'!!

[boing]

Wodrick,

It has been some years now but do I not remember that pushing or pulling the 727 control column to oppose trim movement physically prevented the trim from moving,

This would have helped in the MAX event, trim moves, you don't like it, oppose it by natural control column movement and the trim locks.


.

[k3k3]

On the E-3, basically a 707-320, if you moved the column in the opposite direction to the stab the stab trim brake would operate with a clunk you couldn't miss.

[boing]

k3k3

Must have been the same system.

.

[Capetonian]

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/damaged ... l_hero_hed

Bird strike blamed?

[barkingmad]

Birdstrike??

Suspicious!

Nice way of trying to deflect responsibility.

[Alisoncc]

Is this Boeing generated "fake news"? Going by the mess the aircraft was in after crashing how could one possibly tell when a small bent piece got to be so. Even so would imagine bird strikes sufficient to affect an AoA vane would be everyday affairs. Hopefully insufficient to bring down two new aircraft. Also a recent "news" clip suggested that an AoA sensor was repaired in a US maintenance shop but not sure which aircraft it referred to, Et or Lion.

[Boac]

Who knows? The basic problem is that ONE 'faulty' sensor should not be able to wreak havoc.

There are huge holes in the Boeing Swiss Cheese, and a big one is why the MCAS authority was changed from an 'approved' 0.6 deg to 2.5 deg without apparently telling anyone. Then there is the way it was apparently 'introduced' to crews - with a single line 'definition of 'MCAS' in the glossary section. The possibility that a crew could, by following the various 'IAS disagree' memory items could get themselves into the position in the (now 'disappeared') video where they could not move the manual wheel. A lot more thought should have gone into the Emergency note issued after LionAir, warning crews of the possibility of running out of control. Barking's query about one pilot in the khazi when it happens is, I think, covered by the fact that the fault would ?probably? only materialise just after take-off, and..................no, I haven't... However, I have flown with lovely lady co-pilots of slight build who would be TOTALLY unable to move that wheel in the situation in the video - as indeed was a 'normal' male at the end.

The MAX needs to be down for a while.

[4mastacker]

I watched this BBC report on the lunchtime news. As a lay man when it comes to flying I can only think of the poor crew and passengers on that ET flight. It seems very damning for Boeing.

ET crew followed Boeing's procedures

[boing]

In an earlier post I did mention the possibility of a bird strike as a cause of the accidents but I considered it unlikely that two aircraft would receive identical bird strikes leading to virtually identical aircraft handling problems in such a short period of time. As Allison mentioned it would be extremely difficult to forensically prove a bird strike from the mess of wreckage.

.

[Boac]

Not sure it matters what caused the faulty signal, really, though as you say improbable to happen to both flights, same side.

[boing]

Following up on 4M's link.

What is Boeing doing improve the aircraft's safety?

In a statement on Thursday, Boeing said: "We will carefully review the AIB's preliminary report and will take any and all additional steps necessary to enhance the safety of our aircraft.

"To ensure unintended MCAS activation will not occur again, Boeing has developed and is planning to release a software update to MCAS and an associated comprehensive pilot training and supplementary education program for the 737 MAX."

The company said the update "adds additional layers of protection and will prevent erroneous data from causing MCAS activation. Flight crews will always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane".

Boeing has issued guidance to pilots on how to manage MCAS, and it plans to install an extra warning system on all 737 Max aircraft, which was previously an optional safety feature.

It is also revising pilot training to provide "enhanced understanding of the 737 Max" flight system and crew procedures.

The planemaker says the upgrades are not an admission that MCAS caused the crashes.

It does not take much perception to see that:

a. Boeing is doing everything they can to avoid taking responsibility for the accidents.
b. Since a major system re-design would be a de-facto admission of guilt they are trying to hide the solution under the guise of software improvements and enhanced training.
c. The real answer to the problem is a dual channel system with comparison. To fit such a system at this time would be an admission that the initial design was flawed and would provide ammunition for lawsuits so Boeing is going to do anything they can to produce a smokescreen.

This is not a software problem as in "the aircraft did something we did not expect because of a software fault". The software did exactly what the coders intended it to do, the problem is that the logic of the software is at fault. I would love to know who the heck was involved in determining the software logic and whether the final system was ever discussed with, or tested by, flight test pilots.

.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

The problem with corporations having the same legal standing as people is that corporations, effectively, are not moral. Pinto fuel tanks, GM ignition switches, Union Carbide Bhopal, etc, they don't give a flying f#ck who they kill if it makes them more money. Add in complex legislation that effectively protects senior management from prosecution, and there's no moral hazard for the individuals making the decisions either. And that complex legislation is written by politicians in political parties that get major donations from the corporations.

[4mastacker]

From the quote in boing's post:

"Flight crews will always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane".

It would appear that that ability was denied to the ET crew despite them following Boeing's procedures.