ET crash ADD NBO

[PHXPhlyer]

Lessor Sees MAX Operational Impact Lasting Into 2021

SMBC Aviation Capital CEO Peter Barrett believes the operational impact of the Boeing 737 MAX grounding could last into 2021, as airlines face the challenges of reintroducing a dormant fleet.

Barrett drew a clear distinction between the regulatory approvals required to get the MAX flying again versus airlines actually resuming MAX operations after such a prolonged grounding. The process is “not simple,” he told Aviation Daily in an interview.

“Our hope is that the aircraft will be upgraded [and approved] relatively soon, but even after that, there’s significant work [for airlines] to get the aircraft back in the air,” Barrett said. “It could be into 2021 before the situation begins to resolve itself properly ... Getting schedules back on track could take many months to sort out.”

The Dublin-based lessor had taken delivery of six MAXs and had 89 more on order when the type was grounded and deliveries halted in March after two fatal crashes. Beyond that, SMBC has a further 15 undelivered MAXs, secured via sale-and-leaseback agreements.

Barrett said SMBC has been communicating closely with Boeing. While the situation remains uncertain, for planning purposes SMBC is anticipating the MAX upgrades will be rolled out during the first quarter of 2020. He declined to comment on possible compensation from Boeing, saying SMBC’s primary focus is the MAX’s safe return to service. Commercial discussions will happen after that.

SMBC also has been affected by Airbus delivery delays, demonstrating how much pressure both major manufacturers are facing. “I do think, in general, the industry is pushing itself very hard. For the last number of years, that has led to production challenges. They need to focus on delivering what they said they’d deliver and when they said they’d deliver it. This is something that the manufacturers need to address,” Barrett said.

He believes the situation is different, however, when it comes to mature aircraft. Asked about the recent problems with some 737NGs, Barrett said: “This is important, but not unusual. Older aircraft suffer from different fatigue issues as they move into maturity.”

Barrett added that it is relatively common for defects to emerge during the later stages of an aircraft’s life and that this is managed by regulators as part of the normal course of business.

As of Sept. 30, SMBC’s portfolio comprised 717 owned, managed and committed aircraft, spanning 83 airline customers in 37 countries. The SMBC portfolio includes 237 owned aircraft, valued at $12.4 billion. The lessor is a narrowbody specialist, primarily taking on widebodies only through sale-and-leaseback agreements. The company also is pursuing a “new-technology” strategy, with latest-generation aircraft making up 42.2% of its portfolio.

PP

[Rwy in Sight]

How reliable is as of today the plan of Boeing to have the aircraft recertified by the end of the year? I understand no test flight has been scheduled and FAA has not announced it has reach a new milestone on verifying Boeing's solution.

[ian16th]

It isn't getting any better for Boeing!

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

The FAA told congressional staff in an email last week Dickson was “concerned that Boeing continues to pursue a return-to-service schedule that is not realistic ... More concerning, the administrator wants to directly address the perception that some of Boeing’s public statements have been designed to force FAA into taking quicker action.”

The new FAA Administrator is publically stating he is being pressured, and wants top cover from Congress for taking as long as he thinks fit.
Steve Dickson is a former F15 driver, then flew for Delta, including 737s and A320s, before retiring as Senior VP Flight Ops in Fall 2018. I don't think he's going to take any sh!t, and doesn't have the standard background for a Government stooge. I think he would walk away tomorrow rather than do a bad job, given he'd already retired.

[Rwy in Sight]

If FAA wants to take a long way to re-granting certification, it is probable that Boeing has being over-optimistic about it and the road back to air is much longer than the manufacturer's estimations.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I would agree. Dickson has apparently listed at least 12 outstanding problems, and has taken Boeing to task about contributing to the holdups itself by not submitting all data when requested.
The process is already planned to take at least 5 times longer than Boeing's initial estimate, and none of their estimates have had the slighest credibility.

[G-CPTN]

Maybe each aircraft in turn should be licensed for a probationary few flights - if it survives then extend the licence - if it crashes then the licence is withdrawn.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Seems a bit harsh, you can work wonders with superglue these days. Have it back on the flightline in no time.

[Rwy in Sight]

I would agree. Dickson has apparently listed at least 12 outstanding problems, and has taken Boeing to task about contributing to the holdups itself by not submitting all data when requested.
The process is already planned to take at least 5 times longer than Boeing's initial estimate, and none of their estimates have had the slighest credibility.

Boeing's inability to provide the required data has me intrigued. We are sure they are willing to co-operate as to get the aircraft back in the air, but then their inability can only be explained by not having the data, or is there another scenario that I don't see?

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

That the data would reveal even more errors, or falsification of data.
I'm not saying it would, but those are alternative reasons.

[Rwy in Sight]

I guess those and they are not very encouraging. Although I hope they come complete clean to the FAA (with the mutual understanding that both made mistakes because the system allowed them to do)

[Slasher]

[PHXPhlyer]

MCAS

Asked on TOP:
Why not have an "MCAS Active" annunciator to show when it is running vs. runaway trim scenario?

PP

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

If you go right back to the beginning, all of the MCAS debacle looks like it was being driven by the promise by the Boeing CEO to his launch customer to stop the MAX counting as a new type, and therefore requiring type training. Therefore the entire point of MCAS was to avoid it being even known about by the aircrew, which means no annunciators, and no changes to the drills. That's why the trim runaway drill wasn't changed, even though it does not cover MCAS failure because it still stated continuous trim runaway, which doesn't cover the intermittent uncommanded trim movement that AoA data failure caused with MCAS.
And would be the smoking gun because it would prove that the entire point of Boeing senior management actions was to deliberately lie to the FAA, rather than it being some accidentally poor design decisions.

And there may be enough hidden in the company emails to prove this. Which may be why Boing is delaying providing data to the FAA even though that's holding up the recertification. Sod the company going bust, it may be about the C-suite keeping themselves out of a loong time in jail.

[PHXPhlyer]

Right Fox:

But now that the cat is out of the bag there's no way to get back in. Knowing that it is active and operating might be worthwhile knowledge.

PP

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I agree completely that the cat is out of the bag. I suspect that Boeing is still desperately fighting to stop the MAX counting as a new type. This may be one element in that fight, but I don't know.
As I said right at the beginning, just about every aspect of the MCAS, from design through programming and operation to drills and training is awful, and that's screamingly obvious to anyone with any flight control systems design and training experience. It's kinda hard to for me to guess why they didn't do X, when I still want to know why they didn't do A, B, C,.........W.

[ian16th]

Boeing Fought Lion Air On Proposed MAX Simulator Training Requirement.

[Boac]

I do not know the 'Quality' of reporting by 'Quartz' but this from them:

"In 2017, shortly after Malaysia’s Malindo Air became the first airline to start flying the 737 Max, a sister airline in the Jakarta-based Lion Air group requested a flight simulator to train pilots on the newly acquired plane, to the irritation of a Boeing technical pilot. Technical pilots are Boeing employees that work with airlines and regulators on training, among other things.

“Now frigging [airline name redacted] may need a sim to fly the Max, and maybe because of their own stupidity,” the pilot wrote in an instant message (pdf, p. 33). “I’m scrambling to figure out how to unscrew this now! idiots.” The pilots’ names were redacted."

Hmm.

[Boac]

Finally the FAA have coughed up the requirements for the Max FCS after all the testing. https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachme ... 8-3-20.pdf.

What puzzles me greatly is that it would appear that the 'isolation' of the MCAS system after a 'failure' still enables uninterupted continuation of the flight? If the dreaded MCAS was so essential to enable certification, why does removal of it from the FCS not constitute a 'land at nearest suitable'??

Page 13 of 36 says
" To assist the flightcrew in properly responding to such an occurrence, a non-normal checklist, called the Speed Trim Fail checklist, would be added to the AFM. This checklist would be used when the STS and MCAS functions are inoperative, and inform the flightcrew to continue normal operation. It would also note that the STS will not provide horizontal stabilizer trim inputs when the airplane deviates from its trimmed airspeed."

So, if it is 'carry on regardless', what was all the fuss about? If it is 'extra training required for crews' why could that not have been done at the beginning by the FAA?

[TheGreenGoblin]

I am going to read in this depth tomorrow, only, probably, to realise, once again, that Boac has pithily summed it up as is his wont.