ET crash ADD NBO

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

My point is that it's a deliberately dysfunctional relationship, and the fault lies with the politicians, who write the laws and render ineffective their own certifiers/regulators.
Abuse of power and corruption, plane and simple

[larsssnowpharter]

'Twas ever thus. One wonders how many staff Boeing has working in DC?

[barkingmad]

The LionAir report now quotes lack of flying skills and poor crew comms as significant factors as well as the rogue airframe.

More chickens coming home to roost as much discussed here and in other fora.

But cost-reductions must continue so the story will also be repeated elsewhere and on other aircraft types.

This is the first I could locate on a quick search;

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... SKBN1X401G

https://www.stuff.co.nz/travel/news/116 ... lot-errors

[barkingmad]

Apologies if this one has been referred already but only just tripped over it this week. The horror show continues;

https://newrepublic.com/article/154944/ ... revolution

[barkingmad]

The gaffer of Boeing looked distinctly uncomfortable at the televised hearings session broadcast briefly on UK MSM yesterday.

Not a lot being said about the Lionair airframe’s previous flight where the jumpseat occupant successfully diagnosed and/or suggested action which saved their lives?

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

The main purpose of congressional enquiries is the opportunity to grandstand for the congressmen.
Fact-finding is purely secondary.

[Boac]

Check viewtopic.php?f=60&t=4807&p=199828#p199828

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

28,000 American Airlines cabin staff refusing to fly on the MAX when it gets recertified unless they get sufficient info to assess its safety themselves, i.e. they no longer trust Boeing or the FAA.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN1XA2JO

[Mrs Ex-Ascot]

How long is it going to be before pilots refuse to fly the MAX?

[boing]

Pilots are not going to refuse to fly the aircraft as a matter of course. In fact, if Boeing tore out the stupid MCAS system and the pilots were simply warned of the unusual handling characteristics of the aircraft under certain unusual conditions they would be back into the aircraft tomorrow. We have all flown aircraft that had a dodgy bit in some part of the envelope, sudden high drag rise on final if you got too slow, uncontrollable pitch down if you got too high and fast or inability to recover from a spin under certain conditions.

The problem here is an attempt to avoid admitting that the aircraft had a relatively minor handling fault that any trained pilot could deal with in order to avoid the cost of that training and the associated risk of having to get the aircraft re-certified. The result is an automatic system that caused more problems than it solved.

Tell me if I am wrong but I doubt if there is a pilot in this group who would refuse to routinely fly a 737MAX with the MCAS removed.

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[Boac]

Well, boing - I am well out of it now, but I have been stunned by the knowledge that even the NG I flew happily had a manual trim system that was extremely difficult, if not impossible to use at high elevator loads. No, I would hope I never got to that situation, but leaving a 'new' low-hour F/O alone while I undertook 'essential maintenance' would give me concerns. So I would not readily join your 'group'. Were I of 'flying' age I would like to see a resolution of the excessive trim wheel forces, I think.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Boeing did not make " an attempt to avoid admitting that the aircraft had a relatively minor handling fault that any trained pilot could deal with in order to avoid the cost of that training and the associated risk of having to get the aircraft re-certified", they succeeded in it. Until the d@mn things started dropping out of the sky. And even then, and now, they are portraying the problem as something needing "a software fix".
The certification process is fatally compromised by government corruption and/or incompetence, and Boeing are exploiting that to produce sh!t aircraft with lethal faults, hidden from the operators, to make a few more bucks. Based on a bunch of other areas, as well as this case, it seems clear that the likes of Boeing are not exploiting ill-thought-out loopholes, but are actively lobbying to put those loopholes there in the first place.
I don't give a d@mn what's wrong with the aircraft as long as I am told about it, or even just given enough clues to work it out for myself. I recall groundschool on the JP, where the instructor (a retired Lightning pilot) read out that "manual bailout may require considerable physical effort". He then paused, looked at us, and said "That means, you're gonna die.". A clear briefing of the problem, and one can decide to live with it or choose another line of work.
I repeat my assertion at the beginning of this; what else is wrong with it? The problems being that Boeing are highly likely to have screwed up the design of other systems based on this level of incompetence, and certain not to tell you about it if they can make a buck by doing so. And the FAA will collect their paychecks and say nowt.

[barkingmad]

O M G !

“That means you’re gonna die”.

Imagine that being said to todays crop of cotton-wool wrapped spoon-fed students.

There’d be immediate tears and a rush for the inevitable ‘safe space’ whilst the lecturer would be texted their suspension or termination by the welfare officer.

Aah, the good old days!

[Alisoncc]

Boeing did not make " an attempt to avoid admitting that the aircraft had a relatively minor handling fault that any trained pilot could deal

I would suggest that it's far from a "minor handling fault" given that a significant number of new aircraft have now been grounded for nine months with little forthcoming as to when this whole debacle may come to an end. Anyone know whether they are doing test flights yet? I would assume that Boeing get dispensations from the FAA to fly the beast for testing purposes? With so much publicity in this area, I doubt Boeing would be able to carry out any test flights without it being reported.

[ian16th]

Does the FAA have the authority and the testicles to say to Boeing, the Max is too different to be called a 737, and must go through type approval as a new a/c type?

[Mrs Ex-Ascot]

Does anyone know what is happening with the slowed down production line? Is production going to continue if the MAX doesn't get airborne soon or will Boeing end up in the situation of having to halt construction due to running out of storage space?

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Ian16th; Yes, and No.
Production was slowed in April to 42 per month (20% cut). Storage is running out around Seattle, but is basically unlimited in Arizona. It would be reasonable and possible to allow transfer there as a route over sparsely populated areas is easy, e.g. out and down off the west coast then in around Camp Pendleton, CA and over desert. As yet there have been no canceled orders so customers are still expecting them when recertification happens. Boeing is still stating it expects recertification this quarter, but has quietly dropped the early from this quarter as we are already there.
The former head of the NTSB has just stated that he thinks the FAA should share some of the blame, and that it now has a worldwide credibility problem.
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/11/01/f ... ssues.html
These guys all go to the same dinner parties, and the former head of the NTSB is probably being used to say what the current head of the FAA is thinking, in much the same way as former ambassadors do about current Foreign Office thinking in the UK. The new FAA head will therefore, as I suggested a while back, be going overboard on i-dotting and t-crossing. Others will have more experience of the FAA than me, but I cannot see a major ass-covering operation like this happening in less than another 6 months at best. The key question is when a significant number of airlines start bailing out and ordering airbuses. A secondary question is the progress of the legal side. Either could see Boeing halting production of the MAX completely. The longer the recert. is delayed, the more that can go wrong, including more revelations about who knew what and when during the initial design and certification. Rumour control would indicate that the entire process Boeing used is rotten from one end to the other, ditto with the FAA, and that there is a lot more to be revealed; we shall see.

[ian16th]

The key question is when a significant number of airlines start bailing out and ordering airbuses.

Surely Airbus delivery dates would be too long for most customers?

[Alisoncc]

Far too often people think of software development as a collection of techie nerds gathered around a screen and scribbling lines of code, when the reality is there many be thousands of programmers individually working on small pieces of code that are then assembled into a whole. Managing the development process is where the real skills are needed. Development methodologies are of critical importance. Systems are far too complex for any individual to wholly comprehend. The important people are the systems engineers.

It's all to easy for bean counters to outsource to the lowest bidder the development of the bits, whilst cutting back on the expensive systems engineers who understand how it all fits together. I am familiar with this having been acquainted with it on more than a few occasions.

So consideration may need to be given to the very real possibility that the MCAS system may not be fixable. My take on the situation is that Boeing may well be floundering, being unable to now rectify the system as the people who were capable have moved elsewhere.

So what will happen if Boeing cannot come up with a satisfactory, safe, certifiable solution? Worth thinking about.

[boing]

Part of the solution would be to introduce AoA sensor technology that did not require a sensor that is so delicate and prone to damage.

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