ET crash ADD NBO

[OFSO]

Painfully obvious how nothing Boeing is now releasing hasn't been analysed in great depth by their anti-litigation team before publication, yet most, if not all of us who were engineers, can see the truth.

[Slasher]

Looks to me like:

- The capt is flat chat giving back stick just trying to keep at least from losing height;
- He can't pull back the throttles to reduce the high IAS as this would result in a nose down moment;
- The crew doesn't have the luxury of altitude;
- Someone puts the stab trim switch(es) back on as a last ditch desperate attempt to stop crashing into the rising hills. I know NBO - those mountains around the airport are bad.

Holy sh!t! The poor bastards.

Two 738 instructors here mentioned to me a coupla day's ago the donks on the 800 Max are tilted more upwards than the 800, thus increasing the ND moment difference between the 800 and Max.

My fellow aviators I say yet again, and for the record, utilising the damn STABILISER and not the ELEVATOR for stall recovery augmentation was a gross act of design **** to begin with. Thing it through brothers - everything followed from it.

[Boac]

It gets worse: From the Washington Post (and, as far as I know, not 'Fake News')

"But later Thursday, Boeing confirmed to The Washington Post that it had found a second software problem that the Federal Aviation Administration has ordered fixed — separate from the anti-stall system that is under investigation in the two crashes and is involved in the worldwide grounding of the aircraft.

That additional problem pertains to software affecting flaps and other flight-control hardware and is therefore classified as critical to flight safety, said two officials with knowledge of the investigation."

[ian16th]

Two 738 instructors here mentioned to me a coupla day's ago the donks on the 800 Max are tilted more upwards than the 800, thus increasing the ND moment difference between the 800 and Max.

It seem to me that the basic problem was that the engine selected, would not fit the airframe.

i.e. when landing the mainplane is too close to the ground.

To workaround this, Boeing have gone from one fudge to another.

[Wodrick]

Nail - hammer - head

[boing]

If I read this correctly Boeing has admitted that the MCAS system was responsible for both accidents, dated April 5th.

Muilenburg said the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System of the aircraft was the cause of both accidents as the system was erroneously activated shortly after take off. The MCAS forces the aircraft into a dive in order to avoid stalling.

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News ... 554440554/



.

[Slasher]

You read correctly boing.

[k3k3]

Time to resurrect the 757? Same fuselage barrel and an undercarriage to fit any engines you want under the wings.

[Boac]

No production line capability?

[Boac]

Not just the FAA sleep-walking? From Reuters:

"The European Aviation and Space Agency (EASA) certified the plane as safe in part because it said additional procedures and training would “clearly explain” to pilots the “unusual” situations in which they would need to manipulate a rarely used manual wheel to control, or “trim,” the plane’s angle.

Those situations, however, were not listed in the flight manual, according to a copy from American Airlines seen by Reuters.

The undated EASA certification document, available online, was issued in February 2016, an agency spokesman said.

It specifically noted that at speeds greater than 230 knots (265mph, 425kph) with flaps retracted, pilots might have to use the wheel in the cockpit’s center console rather than an electric thumb switch on the control yoke.

EASA and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ultimately determined that set-up was safe enough for the plane to be certified, with the European agency citing training plans and the relative rarity of conditions requiring the trim wheel."

Thanks for telling everybody...................... Lawyers must be already ordering their Porsches by the dozen.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Anyone think the MAX was ever safe to be certified?

The problem is not really Boeing, it is the corruption and incompetence in the Government safety agencies, and as such they are worse than useless. And therefore the Government itself is corrupt and/or incompetent.

How many are left who you can trust, are competent, AND who have authority, anywhere?

[Boac]

Subject to what this 'second' fault Boeing have admitted to, and the apparent 'unreliability' of the AoA system on the MAX of course, yes, I do.

Had it been certified WITHOUT MCAS and with a warning - written clearly and unambiguously the pilots should exercise caution at high angles of attack due to a lightening of the stick force, I think it would have been fine. The AoA problem MAY have engendered false stick shaker, but that is something that can be handled, and switched off.

Problem then, of course, would be getting the certification process to accept this.

[ian16th]

Subject to what this 'second' fault Boeing have admitted to, and the apparent 'unreliability' of the AoA system on the MAX of course, yes, I do.

Had it been certified WITHOUT MCAS and with a warning - written clearly and unambiguously the pilots should exercise caution at high angles of attack due to a lightening of the stick force, I think it would have been fine. The AoA problem MAY have engendered false stick shaker, but that is something that can be handled, and switched off.

Problem then, of course, would be getting the certification process to accept this.

Not a problem when the job of certification is outsourced back to Boeing!

[Boac]

Well, not quite, ian - it was the FAA who required something - not Boeing. Boeing put in MCAS. The fact that Boeing then 'lied' about MCAS's authority..................

[ian16th]

Well, not quite, ian - it was the FAA who required something - not Boeing. Boeing put in MCAS. The fact that Boeing then 'lied' about MCAS's authority..................

Sarcasm never travels well over the Internet.

Sorry, I shouldn't have used it.

[Boac]

Did get it - it is a pertinent comment, but then thought you might be serious. helps.

[OFSO]

I hear that not just Boeing but every manufacture of components is being hit with lawsuits left right and centre.

[Boac]

Perhaps not a good time to hold shares in companies associated with aircraft production.

[OFSO]

Deja vu - reading the suggestion that (a) sensor redundancy and (b) flight deck annunciators are now called for on MCAS gave me an uneasy sense of deja vu. Where have I read this before relating to the 737 ? A search through my own archives brought forward this....

FAA AD 2002-20-07 Revision 1.

"Within 6 years...install a new rudder control system that includes new components (...) and additional wiring throughout the airplane to support failure annunciation of the rudder control system in the flight deck. The system must also incorporate two separate inputs, each with an override mechanism, to two separate servo valves on the main rudder PCU, and an input to the standby PCU that will also include an override mechanism."

This was issued following the uncommanded rudder deflections on 737s on 03.03.1991, UA585; 11.04.1994, CO; 08.09.1994 US427; 09.06.1996 EA517; 19.02.1999 UA; 23.02.1999 Metrojet.

[Boac]

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