A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

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A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#1 Post by prospector » Sat Nov 23, 2019 1:27 am

https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/arti ... d=12286440

His view would be of much more value than Justice Mahons, in my view.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#2 Post by Pontius Navigator » Sat Nov 23, 2019 9:44 am

As they say in the trade, CuGranite has a PK of one. Our sqn cdr ignored the rule and proved the point with 10 others in board. We might have hit a small island off Scotland as our Nav had not plotted it on his chart. We bought him an Atlas.

In my day, even with a superb radar, we were not permitted to descend below safety altitude, even if in visual contact with the ground, unless we had VMC and could see ahead as well. With radar, provided we were 10 miles clear of land we could descend to 1,500 feet.

Later, in Maritime, we could go to 300 feet but even that could be problematic without radar.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#3 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:51 am

A complacent, one might say arrogant, corporate culture and an egregious flight planning department mistake followed by a pilot's error leading to a terrible accident whose ramifications were exacerbated by Air New Zealand's (and NZ governmental departments) attempts to whitewash themselves and blame the pilot alone.

Links in the chain of disaster...

Interesting that this Grundy character would come out with this attempt to lay it all on the pilot again this late in the day.
"Jim was a very careful pilot. He flew by the book. [But] I think he was under pressure to give passengers a good view. What he did was virtually abandon the tenets of good airmanship at the expense of trying to get the passengers the best view they can.

"He didn't check the terminating waypoint on his flight bay before descending below minimum altitude, before descending below safety altitude. That is a fundamental requirement of all pilots - then and now - before you go below your safety altitude, you must know where you are."
The fact is that the pilot probably believed he knew where he was and descended based on that erroneous belief.
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#4 Post by Slasher » Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:53 am

Always had a sneaking question about him descending below the LSA / MORA without being fully satisfied he was in VMC. Then again he saw what he expected to see.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#5 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:04 am

Slasher wrote:
Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:53 am
Always had a sneaking question about him descending below the LSA / MORA without being fully satisfied he was in VMC. Then again he saw what he expected to see.
Precisely.

+1

VMC doesn't preclude the kind of whiteout illusion that led to the final fatal mistake in this accident chain.
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#6 Post by ExSp33db1rd » Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:20 am

The fact is that the pilot probably believed he knew where he was and descended based on that erroneous belief.
From what I've read " Impact Erebus" by Gordon Vette, and "The Erebus Papers", a 735 page tome of documents, statements and the like from the era, it seems that he was convinced he was in the right place and had a so-called Antarctic "expert" sat on the flight deck visually identifying supposed "landmarks" and so continued his descent below Company SOP's. I do find it odd tho' that he was not concerned that he couldn't receive the McMurdo DME. Had he been where he thought he was then he should have been able to receive it without any high ground obscuring the signal ?

There is no doubt that Air NZ gave him a flt. plan containing incorrect navigation data, unlike the one he had been briefed on the day before.

Pilot error ? Maybe, but the pilot always makes the last error. The last hole in the lump of cheese.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#7 Post by Boac » Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:33 am

The issue is not one of 'VMC', Slasher, as I understand it, but of inadequate visual definition in VMC and a few other very significant navigation issues. I thought it was said that the Mount was 'invisible' against the white background? A bit like the green hill in front of bigger green hills so familiar to those of us who have practised 'low level'.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#8 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:37 am

ExSp33db1rd wrote:
Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:20 am
The fact is that the pilot probably believed he knew where he was and descended based on that erroneous belief.
From what I've read " Impact Erebus" by Gordon Vette, and "The Erebus Papers", a 735 page tome of documents, statements and the like from the era, it seems that he was convinced he was in the right place and had a so-called Antarctic "expert" sat on the flight deck visually identifying supposed "landmarks" and so continued his descent below Company SOP's. I do find it odd tho' that he was not concerned that he couldn't receive the McMurdo DME. Had he been where he thought he was then he should have been able to receive it without any high ground obscuring the signal ?

There is no doubt that Air NZ gave him a flt. plan containing incorrect navigation data, unlike the one he had been briefed on the day before.

Pilot error ? Maybe, but the pilot always makes the last error. The last hole in the lump of cheese.
+1
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#9 Post by Ex-Ascot » Mon Nov 25, 2019 12:11 pm

Para dropping I once descended below MDA which is very high near Weston on the Green due to a massive mast. I was navigating on a VOR/DME fix. Thought the chances of me being anywhere near the mast were slim. Popped out of cloud and there it was in my 12. A few miles away, however!
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#10 Post by Pontius Navigator » Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:01 pm

Once had a baby pilot planned a Chipmunk flight Coningsby to St Athan. He planned the route via TV masts etc. Had no idea how high he would have to go to get over them and how wide they are if he tried to fly round. Fortunately the trip was cancelled. It would have been my only single engine flying time.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#11 Post by llondel » Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:40 pm

The masts themselves aren't that wide, but I assume there's a required lateral separation in the rules too. Flying at a couple of thousand feet should clear most of them, although when you get one like the Mendip TV mast it depends very much from which direction you approach.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#12 Post by Pontius Navigator » Mon Nov 25, 2019 10:39 pm

Llondel, I think there were problems with his plan. The generally poor vis that day, probably why it was cancelled, lack of nav aids, and don't for get the mast supports.

Flying over the top starts to push you into controlling airspace as well.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#13 Post by Boac » Tue Nov 26, 2019 8:13 am

As long as visibility is sufficient and you remember the mast stays, using vertical waypoints is lesson 1 in navigating at low level. Baby pilot was half-way there. Why he should want to go 'over' them I do not understand.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#14 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Tue Nov 26, 2019 8:36 am

The Wenvoe and St Hillary transmission masts sticking up above the fog were always good landmarks near Cardiff Wales Airport on those not so VFR days and superb pointers on sunny VFR days...
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#15 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Tue Nov 26, 2019 8:41 am

TheGreenGoblin wrote:
Tue Nov 26, 2019 8:36 am
The Wenvoe and St Hillary transmission masts sticking up above the fog were always good landmarks near Cardiff Wales Airport on those not so VFR days and superb pointers on sunny VFR days...
Although Wenvoe was reviled in parliament at the time of its construction, I think it has proven to be more of a boon than an impediment to aviation in the area and nobody, to my knowledge, has contrived to fly into either of these structures yet!

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hans ... se-airport
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#16 Post by prospector » Thu Nov 28, 2019 2:45 am

Trying to put blame entirely on the company when the company never laid down any procedure below MSA, that was entirely at the discretion of the crew.

These were the standing orders for the descent at McMurdo, taken from the publication by John King, New Zealand Tragedies Aviation.

" Before the 28 November flight the McMurdo NDB was officially withdrawn. Although still operating, it was no longer being maintained and so its accuracy could not be guaranteed. The nearby TACAN was used instead. This was referred to in Company memorandum to AntArctic crews, OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed MCMURDO NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous
Deletev all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 grid through 360 grid to 270 grid from McMurdo field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in area.

A copy of this memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage, so there was no way the crew were not aware of it."

McMurdo Centre stated that the DC10 never appeared on their radar, they never got
a DME lockon, and no contact with McMurdo on VHF radio. Why??? because there was a mountain called Mt Erebus blocking all VHF communication.

So it would appear that not one of the mandatory requirements for descent below MSA, FL160, was met before descent commenced. The reported weather was well below descent requirements.

And according to Mr Justice Mahons report the crew were blameless???? This was the crews first trip to the ice, apart from 1 engineer I believe, these requirements were laid down to ensure the outcome that eventuated was not theoretically possible, whiteout or any other unforseen occurence notwithstanding.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#17 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Thu Nov 28, 2019 9:02 am

prospector wrote:
Thu Nov 28, 2019 2:45 am
Trying to put blame entirely on the company when the company never laid down any procedure below MSA, that was entirely at the discretion of the crew.

These were the standing orders for the descent at McMurdo, taken from the publication by John King, New Zealand Tragedies Aviation.

" Before the 28 November flight the McMurdo NDB was officially withdrawn. Although still operating, it was no longer being maintained and so its accuracy could not be guaranteed. The nearby TACAN was used instead. This was referred to in Company memorandum to AntArctic crews, OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed MCMURDO NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous
Deletev all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 grid through 360 grid to 270 grid from McMurdo field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in area.

A copy of this memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage, so there was no way the crew were not aware of it."

McMurdo Centre stated that the DC10 never appeared on their radar, they never got
a DME lockon, and no contact with McMurdo on VHF radio. Why??? because there was a mountain called Mt Erebus blocking all VHF communication.

So it would appear that not one of the mandatory requirements for descent below MSA, FL160, was met before descent commenced. The reported weather was well below descent requirements.

And according to Mr Justice Mahons report the crew were blameless???? This was the crews first trip to the ice, apart from 1 engineer I believe, these requirements were laid down to ensure the outcome that eventuated was not theoretically possible, whiteout or any other unforseen occurence notwithstanding.
that was entirely at the discretion of the crew.

And the crew exercised that discretion on the basis of their belief that they knew exactly where they were based upon the erroneous flight plan produced by Air New Zealand and that the weather conditions met the prescribed minima and, most important, had a VFR perspective that matched what they expected to see.

They, as you say, had not made radio contact with McMurdo radio but as the flight did not intend to impinge on the airfield circuit/pattern and they could not hear any other aircraft, so the crew elected to descend anyway. HF communications are often very difficult at very high latitudes and can be completely blocked at times of peak auroral activity. Sure they would have expected VHF/UHF radio to work but McMurdo operates a radio service and is a quasi military base. How often has one called such a service or requested MATZ penetration only to be met by a deafening silence because the folks manning the radio were having a cup of tea or for some other equally tedious reason like the operator had just gone out to take a leak. I wonder what Air New Zealand's operational management might have thought if the Captain had elected to abort his flight and return over thousands of miles at huge cost to the company with the flimsy excuse that he wasn't able to contact the ice base which was not his intended landing point or destination anyway? See link below for more current procedures and upgrades that have been made at the base ref. radio comms.

I don't think that anybody here is suggesting that crew were blameless but on the balance of the issues in the chain of accident causality their mistake was far outweighed by the many egregious mistakes pertaining to the company, not least the company's operational hubris in allowing a flying crew who had never accompanied another experienced crew in any sort of familiarization in flying at low level in demanding polar conditions to make a VFR flight to visit an Antarctic mountain.

https://www.aviationtoday.com/2001/07/0 ... ntarctica/
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#18 Post by prospector » Thu Nov 28, 2019 10:04 pm

Admittedly the Company certainly made many errors, sending a Captain down there in command on his first flight to the ice being a major one. No advice taken from either RNZAF or the American Deep Freeze crews who had to carry out flights either as first officer or supernumerary crew prior to going down in command.

But as for the crew discretion, the way I believe that applies was the decision to go below MSA was theirs, but if that decision was made the conditions as were laid out in the mandatory descent requirements had to be complied with.

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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#19 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Thu Nov 28, 2019 10:49 pm

prospector wrote:
Thu Nov 28, 2019 10:04 pm
Admittedly the Company certainly made many errors, sending a Captain down there in command on his first flight to the ice being a major one. No advice taken from either RNZAF or the American Deep Freeze crews who had to carry out flights either as first officer or supernumerary crew prior to going down in command.

But as for the crew discretion, the way I believe that applies was the decision to go below MSA was theirs, but if that decision was made the conditions as were laid out in the mandatory descent requirements had to be complied with.
Prospector twas a tragic event and, as much as I admire Air New Zealand it was a learning experience for for us all.
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Re: A professional pilots view on Erebus accident. He had also done that flight

#20 Post by prospector » Fri Nov 29, 2019 9:08 pm

The company has been hauled over the coals many times for lack of foresight when these trips were planned, however, one problem that had been covered was whiteout. Again from John King publication "New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation".

"We didn't put anything in the briefing about whiteout, but we discussed it with Operation Deep Freeze and went into quite some depth. At 6,000ft there was no whiteout"
That was part of Captain Gemmel, ("chief pilot.) statement.

"But the 6,000ft aspect was more than a company order, to be broken by pilots if they felt like it and the weather was fine. It was a strict CAD rule, part of the original conditions for the airlines scenic flights to Antarctica as stipulated by by the Director of Civil Aviation under regulation 136(3) giving vertical clearance from Mt Aurora, the highest point in the sightseeing manoeuvring area".

The impact point was at 1,500ft. How could Justice Mahon come to the conclusion that the crew were blameless? A problem with that view that is widely held now is
"Because the findings of the Royal Commission on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike to Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account---and has never officially been challenged"

I have been over to the "other" site, and the level of ignorance of any fact appertaining to this disaster, other than "Mahons finding the crew were blameless" is quite astounding.

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