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More Boeing Bad News

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#721 Post by PHXPhlyer » Tue Nov 30, 2021 8:01 pm

Congress wants answers from FAA regarding Boeing 737Max.

https://transportation.house.gov/imo/me ... cluded.pdf

The Honorable Stephen M. Dickson
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
Dear Administrator Dickson:
Thank you for testifying before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Aviation last month. We appreciate the FAA’s ongoing work to
implement the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) to hold Boeing and other
aviation manufacturers accountable and to ensure the agency has the expertise and processes in
place to perform effective safety regulation and oversight. However, during the hearing, two issues
arose regarding your recollection of Boeing’s past actions in which we would like to receive a more
complete account from FAA.
Angle of Attack Disagree Alert
The first issue, as raised by Rep. Sharice Davids, concerns Boeing’s actions regarding the
Angle of Attack (AOA) Disagree alert. As documented in our September 2020 investigative report,
in August 2017 when Boeing first discovered that this alert was inoperable on more than 80 percent
of 737 MAX aircraft, Boeing decided to wait nearly three years to fix the problem so it could execute
the fix as a part of its then-planned rollout of the 737 MAX-10 in 2020.
1 Boeing also did not notify
the FAA, its MAX customers, or MAX pilots that the alert was not working and continued to
manufacture hundreds of more 737 MAX aircraft with the same non-functioning alert.2 Boeing
failed to divulge the fact that the alert was not functioning until October 2018, only after the fatal
Lion Air crash.

Page 2
2
Boeing defended its actions by saying this was not a safety issue, and they highlighted the
fact that a Boeing Authorized Representative, an individual authorized to perform work on behalf of
the FAA, concurred with Boeing’s decision to delay the fix.
4 However, the nonfunctioning AOA
Disagree alert appears to have violated the 737 MAX type design. As then-Acting Administrator
Dan Elwell said in a letter to our committee in July 2019:
Once certified by the FAA, all features included on the airplane
become part of the certified type design or approved type design.
These features are mandatory in each airplane produced to that type
design thereafter, whether or not they are required for safety . . .
Although an AOA disagree message was not necessary to meet
FAA safety regulations, once it was made part of the approved
type design, it was required to be installed and functional on all
737 MAX airplanes Boeing produced.
5
[Emphasis added.]
Our committee highlighted this issue, and Boeing’s action, in our investigative report on the
737 MAX not because we believed it was a safety issue, but because it was clearly a glaring issue of
lax accountability and oversight. Yet, to date, we are unaware of any actions the FAA has taken to
hold Boeing accountable for violating the approved type design of the 737 MAX, knowingly
continuing to manufacture the aircraft regardless of this known defect and failing to inform your
agency—or 737 MAX customers—of this nonfunctioning component on the aircraft until after the
Lion Air crash.
Boeing has claimed its senior leadership was unaware of these issues at the time. However,
our report showed that multiple individuals across the company were aware of this issue. If Boeing’s
senior management was unaware of these issues impacting more than 80 percent of the 737 MAX
fleet that rolled off its assembly line, then that should have raised serious questions within the
company about its ability to manage the production of its commercial aircraft fleet effectively and
safely.
Boeing’s actions showed an utter disregard for the FAA’s regulatory process. We
acknowledge that in your testimony you mentioned that you are taking steps to implement and
improve your oversight of Boeing. However, our direct questions are:
• What specifically has the FAA done to hold Boeing accountable for deceiving its
customers and violating the FAA’s regulations by knowingly producing 737 MAX
aircraft with nonfunctioning AOA Disagree alerts that resulted in the production of
nonconforming aircraft prior to the Lion Air crash?
Please be specific in your response and provide all records that indicate any actions the
FAA took against Boeing in regard to the issues outlined above. As part of your
response, please also inform the committee of whether the Boeing Authorized
Representative who concurred with Boeing’s decision to delay fixing the AOA Disagree
alert for three years is still authorized to conduct work on behalf of the FAA.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#722 Post by PHXPhlyer » Tue Nov 30, 2021 8:02 pm

Congress wants answers from FAA regarding Boeing 737Max. Part 2

https://transportation.house.gov/imo/me ... cluded.pdf

Page 3

Boeing Efforts to Downplay MCAS
The second issue raised at the October 21, 2021 hearing, by Rep. Greg Stanton, concerns the
degree of FAA’s awareness about efforts within Boeing to downplay MCAS.
As you know, in January 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) entered into a deferred
prosecution agreement with Boeing in which Boeing admitted that, “through two of its 737 MAX
Flight Technical Pilots,” Boeing deceived the FAA AEG about MCAS,6
and more recently DOJ
announced an indictment against former Boeing Chief Technical Pilot Mark Forkner for deceiving
the FAA about MCAS.7 The DOJ determined that an independent compliance monitor was
unnecessary for its deferred prosecution agreement for several reasons, including their conclusion
that, “the misconduct was neither pervasive across the organization, nor undertaken by a large
number of employees, nor facilitated by senior management…”8
At the hearing last month, Rep. Stanton referenced a Boeing internal document from 2013
uncovered as part of our committee’s investigation, a copy of which is enclosed for your
convenience. This document, which summarizes the minutes of an internal Boeing meeting, details
an explicit plan by multiple Boeing employees to downplay MCAS externally, including to regulators.
The rationale for doing so was laid out explicitly in the document, which said, “f we emphasize
MCAS is a new function, there may be a greater certification and training impact.”9 This set a plan in
motion to limit the use of the MCAS nomenclature externally and to downplay the system as “new,”
by describing it as “an addition to Speed Trim.” A Boeing Authorized Representative signed off on
the plan.
The document shows that multiple individuals were involved in this plan and does not
identify any of them as technical pilots, which was the job description of those identified in recent
DOJ filings. In addition, we know from our committee’s investigation that the Chief Project
Engineer on the 737 MAX acknowledged that achieving “Level B” (non-flight simulator) training
requirements for pilots or less was a “design objective” of the 737 MAX program.10 This was a
directive designed and enforced by Boeing’s senior most management and, as our report showed, it
had ripple effects throughout the MAX program. This “design objective” combined with the 2013
meeting minutes help to highlight the fact that there were multiple efforts at Boeing from the top of
the company on down that emphasized both the critical importance of avoiding flight simulator
training as an FAA requirement and the fact that full and clear knowledge of MCAS by external
parties, including regulators, could jeopardize that corporate goal.

Page 4
4
After describing the 2013 document, Rep. Stanton asked if you were aware of anyone at
Boeing, other than the two technical pilots referenced in DOJ’s deferred prosecution agreement,
who tried to downplay the significance of MCAS to regulators. You responded, “I am not aware of
any particular individuals.” When Rep. Stanton followed up to ask you whether you believe there
were more than two Boeing employees who tried to downplay the significance of MCAS, you said,
“I believe that MCAS should have been included in the materials and that it was a safety critical
system. Whether there was any intentionality on the part of others I can’t speak to.”11 We believe the
attached document makes it abundantly clear that there was an intentional plan to downplay the
significance of MCAS to regulators by multiple individuals at Boeing.
As you recall, the issue was not just whether FAA was aware of MCAS, but how MCAS was
presented to the FAA. According to the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), which was
convened by your agency to review the 737 MAX crashes:
The FAA was not completely unaware of MCAS; however, because
the information and discussions about MCAS were so fragmented
and were delivered to disconnected groups within the process, it was
difficult to recognize the impacts and implications of this system. If
the FAA technical staff had been fully aware of the details of the
MCAS function, the JATR team believes the agency likely would
have required an issue paper for using the stabilizer in a way that it
had not previously been used. MCAS used the stabilizer to change
the column force feel, not trim the aircraft. This is a case of using the
control surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for
and should have required an issue paper for further analysis by the
FAA. If an issue paper had been required, the JATR team believes it
likely would have identified the potential for the stabilizer to
overpower the elevator.12
While we appreciate FAA’s current efforts to implement the ACSAA and the
recommendations of the JATR, which will help to enhance FAA’s oversight of Boeing and will
improve the accountability of Boeing employees or others who endanger the safety of the flying
public in the future, we are deeply troubled by the absence of rigorous accountability for Boeing’s
past transgressions related to the 737 MAX and the FAA’s failure to hold those who violated the
public’s trust accountable. We must continue to move forward on improving the safety of our
nation’s aviation certification process, while at the same time not losing sight of past missteps or
misdeeds.
We would like to know what, if any, actions FAA has taken to evaluate and investigate the
efforts by Boeing to downplay MCAS, particularly to U.S. and foreign regulators. We are not asking
you to rehash the efforts FAA has taken to establish JATR or other bodies to review the
certification process or the MAX accidents, or what Boeing ultimately disclosed to FAA about

Page 5
5
MCAS. We are interested in any actions by the FAA to hold individuals accountable for their
actions.
• Has the FAA identified the Authorized Representative who concurred with the plan to
downplay MCAS?
o If so, has the FAA interviewed this individual and/or requested related documents?
o Is this Authorized Representative still authorized to conduct work as a Boeing ODA
Unit Member on behalf of the FAA?
o Please provide the committee with copies of all records related to the FAA’s efforts,
if any, regarding the above questions.
• Did the FAA ever investigate the circumstances or individuals involved in Boeing’s 2013
plan to downplay MCAS?
o Please provide the committee with copies of all records related to the FAA’s efforts,
if any, regarding the above question.
o What, if anything, has FAA done to hold any of the individuals at Boeing
accountable who took part in Boeing’s 2013 efforts to downplay MCAS?
o Please provide the committee with copies of all records related to the FAA’s efforts,
if any, regarding the above question.
• Does FAA regard the actions memorialized in the enclosed Boeing document as acceptable?
Thank you for your time in addressing these important matters. Please provide a response to
this letter by Monday, December 13, 2021. We look forward to continuing to work with the FAA to
implement the ACSAA to improve safety, oversight, and accountability. With continuing issues with
the Boeing 737 MAX and the 787, and the ongoing certification of the Boeing 777X, it is more
critical than ever that the FAA takes its role as regulator seriously. FAA must fully investigate actions
by Boeing or others that jeopardize the public’s safety or disregard FAA’s regulations, and hold
responsible parties accountable. Our hope is that with continued implementation of the ACSAA,
issues like those discussed above do not arise in the future.
The Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
November 29, 2021
Page 6
6
Sincerely,

PETER A. DeFAZIO RICK LARSEN GREG STANTON
Chair Chair Member
Subcommittee on Aviation Subcommittee on Aviation
Encl.
cc: The Honorable Sam Graves, Ranking Member
Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure
The Honorable Garret Graves, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Aviation

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#723 Post by PHXPhlyer » Sun Dec 12, 2021 10:50 pm

The Times’ Boeing expert offers context on ‘Flying Blind’ — and the sky-high challenges the company faces

https://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw ... any-faces/

By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
BORN IN SEATTLE in 1916, Boeing grew into a champion of American engineering greatness. As former top executive Gordon Bethune put it, for generations of families in the Pacific Northwest, Boeing was “probably the most honest, reputable, best company you would ever work for.”

Just three years ago, Boeing’s stock was at record levels, and then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg was confident of soaring toward greater heights.

THE MAINSTORY A behind-the-scenes look at Boeing’s shifting leadership landscape — and its profound effects
Projecting a never-ending boom in the world’s airliner business, Muilenburg repeatedly declared: “Our aspiration is no longer to be just the best in aerospace. We have to be a global industrial champion.”

Since then, that vision has collapsed piece by piece.

The two crashes of the 737 MAX killed 346 people and destroyed the trust Boeing enjoyed with aviation regulators, who grounded the jet worldwide for more than 21 months.

Deliveries of the 787 Dreamliner have been paralyzed by manufacturing defects for more than a year.

The 777X flight test program is so far behind schedule that this latest new jet won’t get certified before late 2023 at the earliest.

The Air Force repeatedly found debris inside its 767-based aerial tanker. Boeing’s Space program is stalled, embarrassed by the upstart SpaceX.

Since the crashes, nothing has gone right for Boeing.

“How did a company that had prided itself on its engineering prowess, that had perfectionism in its DNA, go so wildly off course?”

That’s the question Peter Robison asks and answers in his new book, “Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing.”

Robison covered Boeing directly as Bloomberg’s aerospace beat reporter for four years until 2002, and he continued to follow the jetmaker’s fortunes thereafter as Seattle bureau chief and more recently as an investigative reporter.

Drawing on extensive interviews with a broad array of Boeing sources, he documents the strategic missteps that — long before the MAX crashes — produced the steady decline in Boeing’s proud engineering culture.

Today’s excerpt covers a key period, from the critical shift in leadership thinking under CEO Phil Condit to the exit of engineering favorite Alan Mulally.

Last year, Boeing was hit by a staggering external blow, even as it struggled to recover from its self-inflicted wounds. The historic pandemic-induced downturn in business loaded the company with debt and forced it to slash jobs. Droves of experienced employees walked out the door.

Can Boeing recover? Robison’s book provides a stark analysis of what needs to change.

Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or dgates@seattletimes.com; on Twitter: @dominicgates.

“Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing.”
I am on the waitlist for this book from my library.
I'm looking forward to reading it.

PP

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#724 Post by Woody » Fri Dec 17, 2021 8:04 pm

When all else fails, read the instructions.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#725 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Sun Dec 19, 2021 3:45 am

PHXPhlyer wrote:
Sun Dec 12, 2021 10:50 pm
The Times’ Boeing expert offers context on ‘Flying Blind’ — and the sky-high challenges the company faces

https://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw ... any-faces/

By Dominic Gates

“Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing.”
I am on the waitlist for this book from my library.
I'm looking forward to reading it.

PP
Thanks for the book heads up. I purchased the Kindle version and haven't been able to put my tablet down,
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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#726 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Sun Dec 19, 2021 4:45 am

It seems that Boeing are going to need a miracle, a bit like this piece of music that they commissioned from Seattle musician Walt Wagner (he later extended it), and former Boeing forklift driver, to write for a party celebrating completion of a huge training facility linked to the 777.




https://thisiswhidbey.com/2019/04/03/mi ... e-of-jets/
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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#727 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Mon Dec 20, 2021 4:00 am

TheGreenGoblin wrote:
Sun Dec 19, 2021 3:45 am
PHXPhlyer wrote:
Sun Dec 12, 2021 10:50 pm
The Times’ Boeing expert offers context on ‘Flying Blind’ — and the sky-high challenges the company faces

https://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw ... any-faces/

By Dominic Gates

“Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing.”
I am on the waitlist for this book from my library.
I'm looking forward to reading it.

PP
Thanks for the book heads up. I purchased the Kindle version and haven't been able to put my tablet down,
Finished the book yesterday and this detailed, well researched account of corporate greed, immorality, hubris and, ultimately, stupidity, set against the background of what was going in the US body politic and US society, generally, left me feeling very angry and profoundly depressed!
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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#728 Post by TheGreenGoblin » Sat Dec 25, 2021 6:03 am

Loss of Qantas and Air France-KLM deals to Airbus highlights Boeing’s competitive gaps
To paraphrase Oscar Wilde: To lose one long-time single-aisle customer, Mr Calhoun, may be regarded as a misfortune, to lose two looks like carelessness.

In recent days, Boeing has done just that, seeing both Air France-KLM and Qantas defect to its arch-rival, further swelling Airbus’s already healthy narrowbody backlog.

Perhaps the charge of carelessness is a little unfair, particularly to level at Boeing chief executive David Calhoun who has only been in post since January 2020. But what is clear is that the Airbus single-aisle range – stretching from the A220-100 at one end to the A321XLR at the other – is simply out-competing the 737 Max family.

There can be no starker illustration of that than the fact that in both cases the carriers were prepared to take the unusual step of transitioning to new narrowbody types.

While Airbus considers the A220 and A320neo as separate aircraft families – they do not share a common type rating – the ability to offer a single-aisle range which essentially spans 150 seats, and addresses both the large regional jet sector and the long-range market previously served by the Boeing 757, gives the airframer significant leverage against the Max.

In the name of efficiency, airlines typically pick a single narrowbody type, and stick with it, and defection is relatively rare.

But aerospace analysts say Airbus’s wins make sense, reflecting a strategy that has seen the European company expand the breadth of its narrowbody product line in recent years.

That line spans two models of the A220 – with 108 to 133 seats – to the 244-passenger A321neo, the latest version of which will have a 4,700nm (8,700km) range.

Air France had already selected the A220, which may have helped tip the renewal decision at partner carrier KLM in Airbus’s favour.

Airbus is pushing hard for A220 sales because the programme, acquired by Airbus from Bombardier in 2018, is loss-making. The aircraft family had secured just over 400 orders under Bombardier, and Airbus subsequently demonstrated its marketing power by adding gross orders for more than 350 in the three years after it took over.

Total A220 orders stood at 650 at the end of November, with a backlog of 464. The airframer wants to build up production loading on the twinjet’s Montreal Mirabel and Mobile assembly lines as part of the strategy to achieve profitability towards the middle of the decade.

Analysts view the 737 Max as being strongly competitive, head-to-head, with the A320neo. But they point out that the Max competes less favourably at the upper and lower margins – where the A220 and A321XLR are situated.

Michel Merluzeau, aerospace analyst with consultancy AIR, says the defections of Air France-KLM and Qantas are a “big loss” for Boeing, noting that it may not regain those customers, at least on the narrowbody side, for at least 15 years.

The defeat at Transavia, currently an all-737 operator, is particularly notable but probably reflects considerations of single-type simplicity.

“It’s pretty simple,” adds Richard Aboulafia, consultant with Teal Group. “Airlines really like the A321neo, and Boeing does not have an alternative.

“That means [airlines] can either split their requirement between Airbus and Boeing, or go with all Airbus, and reap the cost benefits of a common fleet.”

Qantas is expecting to order 20 A321XLRs and 20 A220-300s – both powered by Pratt & Whitney geared turbofans – before the end of its fiscal year 2022, for deliveries beginning in fiscal 2024.

But the airline is also placing rights over 10 years to purchase another 94 Airbus jets to replace older Boeing 737-800s and 717s. Qantas and its affiliates operate about 70 737-800s and 20 717s, according to Cirium data.

There is evidence that fleet commonality played a key part in the Qantas decision, because the company’s budget subsidiary Jetstar is already an Airbus single-aisle operator, and the mainline carrier’s order is being structured to take advantage of pre-existing agreements to supply Jetstar aircraft.

Air France-KLM is placing firm orders for 100 A320neo-family jets and taking rights to acquire another 60. The airline group will use the jets to replace the fleets of its subsidiaries KLM, Transavia and Transavia France – all current 737 operators. KLM has 46 of the Boeing jets, Transavia has 37 and Transavia France has 50, according to Cirium.

“The [Air France-KLM] and Qantas orders clearly show that Boeing needs a new middle-market jet,” says Aboulafia. “I think everybody recognises that.”

Broadly, the industry considers “middle market” aircraft to be those with up to 5,000nm of range and capacity to carry 200-250 passengers.

That job has long been performed by Boeing 757s, which are nearing retirement, and Airbus has sought to capitalise on the mid-market vacancy by extending the range of its A321neo – initially with the A321LR and subsequently with the A321XLR, which the airframer intends to put into service in 2023.

Boeing has struggled to shape a mid-market successor to the 757 that optimally addresses the needs of customers. Although the airframer has developed the 737 Max 10, the largest version of the re-engined jet, in a bid to compete more directly with the A321neo, an all-new mid-market design remains elusive – the proposed NMA concept was among the projects stalled by troubles affecting the company, including the prolonged grounding of the 737 Max.

The crisis affecting the 737 Max has since been supplanted by the pandemic, and aerospace strategies are also having to adjust to the rise of decarbonisation technology. The US airframer remains uncommitted to a new mid-market aircraft.

“As long as Boeing shows no interest in developing one…they will lose market share,” claims Aboulafia.

The Air France-KLM and Qantas orders also highlight Boeing’s lack of aircraft capable of being directly competitive with the A220, says Merluzeau.

Boeing had hoped to bridge that competitive gulf by purchasing 80% of Embraer’s commercial aircraft division through a $4.2 billion deal in 2020.

That agreement would have delivered to Boeing the enormously-successful E-Jet programme, which competes favourably with the A220. The E-Jet family, in its latest re-engined iteration, uses the Pratt & Whitney PW1900G engine – a version of the same geared-fan powerplant fitted to the A220.

Boeing backed out of the deal, to Embraer’s shock, shortly before it was due to close, as other crises simmered at the US airframer.

Merluzeau says, in reference to Airbus’s success with its extended single-aisle range: “It clearly shows what we expected the…Embraer deal to provide Boeing.”
https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers ... 75.article
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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#729 Post by Rwy in Sight » Sat Dec 25, 2021 6:41 am

Maybe Boeing should add to the lists of not-very successful decisions (along with is effort to contest the loss at the US Air Force Tanker competition) the closing down of the 757 program in favour of the 737. And with the benefit of hindsight doing so at a time when long-thin routes were opening thanks to the Open Skies agreement coming up.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#730 Post by PHXPhlyer » Fri Mar 25, 2022 7:40 pm

FAA tells Boeing it doubts MAX 10 will meet safety standard deadline
March 24, 2022 at 6:33 pm Updated March 24, 2022 at 8:11 pm


By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -deadline/

In a critical letter to Boeing this month, the local oversight office of the Federal Aviation Administration said it will be difficult for Boeing to complete certification of the 737 MAX 10 by the end of this year — a crucial deadline.

Certification is the FAA’s declaration that an aircraft is safe to fly passengers. If Boeing misses that cutoff date, the MAX 10 cannot be certified unless it persuades Congress to extend a special exemption from a safety regulation.

Given current progress, the FAA letter casts doubt on Boeing’s publicly stated timelines for certifying both the MAX 10 and the 777-9X jets, and it asks the plane maker to provide updated schedules for both programs.

The letter was not publicly disclosed, but two sources, one within Boeing and one with the FAA, verified its content. The sources asked for anonymity out of fear of losing their jobs.

In a statement, Boeing said it is preparing updated timelines and that the FAA will determine the pace of the certification work.

“We are working to provide official documentation of specific milestones within the certification program in accordance with the FAA’s request,” Boeing said, adding that “we have no updates to share.”

Regarding the possibility of the missed MAX 10 deadline, a Boeing official reiterated Thursday that, as yet, the company “has not requested any official action by any member of Congress.”

However, the official said the company’s lobbyists on Capitol Hill “have been educating congressional members and staff about potential impacts” — presumably a reference to potential job losses in Renton and elsewhere if an exemption wasn’t granted, a scenario that could kill the MAX 10 program.

“We have communicated [to lawmakers] the potential implications for failure to certify the 737-10 by year-end,” the Boeing official said.

The FAA declined to discuss the ongoing certification projects. “Safety will dictate the timeline,” the agency said in a statement.

Much tighter scrutiny
The MAX 10, the final model in the MAX family, first flew in June 2021 and has been in flight testing since. Boeing is depending on sales of this largest version of the MAX to counter the rival hot-selling Airbus A321neo.

More rigorous FAA scrutiny following the failures in oversight in the certification of the original 737 MAX 8 model has slowed approval for the MAX 10.

Further delaying the process, when the European Aviation Safety Agency certified the MAX in 2021, it insisted that certain flight-control system improvements, including an additional angle of attack sensor, must be added to the MAX 10.

The 777-9X, the first and largest 777X model, faces a similarly prolonged certification program.

That giant jet made its first flight in January 2020, kicking off a test flight program that Boeing previously projected would take an unprecedented four years. Past flight test programs typically took just over a year.
The letter questioning the timelines set for both jet programs was signed by Ian Won, the acting manager for aviation safety in the FAA office that oversees Boeing’s certification of new airplanes.

Won has led the tightening of FAA oversight.

Last May, his office ruled the 777X “not yet ready” to pass a key certification milestone and demanded more test data. In August, he initiated a new review of Boeing after a survey of company engineers found a sizable percentage felt they couldn’t raise safety concerns.

The immediate problem his letter highlights for Boeing is the MAX 10 deadline.

The issue is that modern airliners are required to have crew-alerting systems with specific safety features to warn pilots of a malfunction during flight and to help them differentiate, prioritize and respond to different types of alerts.

The crew-alerting system on the 737 MAX, limited by the 1960s-era 737 cockpit systems design, doesn’t meet that standard.

The 737 is the only Boeing jet that doesn’t meet the requirement.

During certification of the 737 MAX 8 in 2014, Boeing persuaded the FAA to relax this specific safety standard, as it had done for all prior 737 models.

Documents obtained by The Seattle Times in 2019 revealed Boeing’s argument to the FAA. Its case rested largely on the 737’s long and generally safe service history.

Boeing statistics show that the previous 737 NG model — the version of the 737 that crashed this week in China — through 2017 had a record among the best of large airliners of 1 serious accident per 6 million departures.

Boeing separately argued in 2014 that it had corrected each of the distinct crew-alerting issues that may have contributed to pilot confusion in three fatal 737 crashes during the previous decade.

And it cited a cost of $10 billion to install a modern crew-alerting system on the MAX. The FAA agreed that this was “impractical.”

However, after the MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019 that killed 346 people, Congress in late 2020 passed the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
The law was written to require tougher certification standards for all future new airplanes. However, it implicitly accepted the MAX’s exemption by setting the law to take effect two years ahead: Jan 1, 2023.

At the time, it was expected the MAX 10 would be certified by then. This would allow pilots who fly the MAX to move from one model to another — from the MAX 8 to the 9 or the 10 — with a common crew-alerting system, and so avoid potential confusion.

If Boeing fails to make the deadline, it must ask lawmakers to give it another pass and amend the date.

PP

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#731 Post by PHXPhlyer » Sun Mar 27, 2022 6:52 pm

Boeing’s problems in China go far beyond the latest grounding

https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/27/business ... index.html

New York
CNN Business

Another Boeing plane has been grounded after a fatal crash, this time in China. That may be the least of the company’s problems in a crucial market.

The decision to ground the Boeing model 737-800 was made by China Eastern Airlines, which operated the jet that crashed March 21, killing all 132 on board. The cause of the crash has yet to be determined, and the grounding could be lifted soon if it turns out the cause was not mechanical.

But Boeing has plenty of other troubles in China, the world’s largest aviation market. It is on the verge of being virtually shut out of the region as trade tensions between the United States and China have basically halted Boeing sales in the country for the last four years. The company has not announced any sales to a Chinese passenger airline since November 2017. Only six months ago, Boeing projected the Chinese market would be worth $1.5 trillion in commercial aircraft purchases over the next 20 years.

It takes a long time to build and deliver planes after they’re ordered, and Boeing continued to deliver jets to China’s airlines and leasing companies in 2018 and early 2019. But only 40 of them have been delivered since March 2019. That’s when aviation authorities around the globe grounded Boeing’s bestselling jet, the 737 Max, after two fatal crashes were found to have been caused by a design flaw. That grounding stretched on for 20 months.

The US Federal Aviation Administration cleared the plane to carry passengers again in November 2020, with most other countries’ aviation authorities following close behind. Airlines that owned the 737 Max were soon flying the plane again.

But not in China, where the aviation regulator — one of the first to ground the Max after the second accident — waited another year to clear the plane to fly. Chinese airlines that own the planes still have not returned them to service.

“We would now expect further delays to Chinese reinstatement of the 737 Max while this accident is investigated, at least until a likely cause is identified,” said a note this week from Melius Research.

Key market
Losing a market as important as China would be a devastating blow to Boeing (BA), which has been hit by one problem after another over the last three years, starting with the 737 Max crashes and then the pandemic, which all but obliterated demand for flying and devastated the finances of its airline customers. More recently, there have been issues with its latest model, the 787 Dreamliner, halting deliveries.

In 2017 and 2018 China accounted for more than 20% of Boeing’s global deliveries, but since the start of 2020 the percentage has dropped to below 5%. (Boeing gets most of its revenue when a plane is delivered.)


China Eastern Airlines grounds 223 Boeing 737-800 aircraft after crash
Some experts believe Boeing has reached agreements to sell some planes to Chinese airlines in the last four years, either through a leasing company or via sales in which the name of the buyer is not made public. But no aircraft orders are official without approval from the Chinese government, which views plane sales as leverage in its negotiations with the United States on overall trade issues, said Richard Aboulafia, aerospace analyst with AeroDynamic Advisory.

Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun told investors in October, “We remain in active discussions with our Chinese customers on their fleet planning needs and continue to urge leaders in both countries to resolve trade differences.”

The longer the current grounding drags on, the more Boeing is at serious risk of losing out on the Chinese market, analysts say.

Typically, an airline is reluctant to switch between aircraft manufacturers because such a pivotal change increases the cost of pilot training and makes spare parts more costly. If Chinese customers with Boeing planes in their fleets were to start buying jets from rival Airbus (EADSF), it would be a long-term shift not easily reversed, and one made by the Chinese government rather than the airlines.

“Boeing has its fans over there. But a political mandate in China is a political mandate,” Aboulafia said.

He and other experts expect Boeing will eventually get back some sales and deliveries in China, but at a much lower number than it was counting on just a few years ago.

China “can get some planes they need from Airbus, but they can’t get all their planes from Airbus,” said Ronald Epstein, aerospace analyst with Bank of America. Aboulafia describes the relationship between China and Boeing as a “bad marriage with no possibility of divorce.”

The only good news for Boeing is China’s aviation sector is not as important as it appeared it would be a decade ago, when experts were projecting the market would account for 30% of all global commercial jet purchases. China’s aviation industry was slowing even before the pandemic, Aboulafia said, from a 12.2% growth rate in 2018’s fourth quarter to 5.3% a year later, just before the outbreak of Covid came to light.

If Boeing loses much of the Chinese market long-term, it will be relegated to being a permanent No. 2 behind Airbus. Global commercial jet sales are essentially a duopoly between the two companies. Being a permanent No. 2 would put Boeing at a long-term competitive disadvantage, Epstein said.

PP

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#732 Post by tango15 » Mon Mar 28, 2022 12:41 pm

It wasn't just Air France/KLM and Qantas who rejected Boeing in favour of Airbus. Air Portugal, who had operated Boeing 707s, 727s, 737s and 747s, now only operates Airbus aircraft.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#733 Post by G-CPTN » Mon Mar 28, 2022 12:59 pm

Was that by choice based on specifications and tests, or purely financial reasons? - ie economical offers that they couldn't ignore?

I can understand the economies of operating single types or manufacturers.

As an engineer for a vehicle manufacturer, there were periods when we were forced to dual-source.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#734 Post by Boac » Mon Mar 28, 2022 1:20 pm

AB offer a greater commonality of type ratings than Boeing, making training cheaper and operations more flexible.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#735 Post by Rwy in Sight » Mon Mar 28, 2022 3:05 pm

tango15 wrote:
Mon Mar 28, 2022 12:41 pm
It wasn't just Air France/KLM and Qantas who rejected Boeing in favour of Airbus. Air Portugal, who had operated Boeing 707s, 727s, 737s and 747s, now only operates Airbus aircraft.
They even had some L-1011. However they have switched to an all Airbus fleet several decades ago - since 1992.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#736 Post by PHXPhlyer » Tue Apr 12, 2022 5:25 pm

Boeing loses more than 90 jet orders due to war in Ukraine

https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/12/business ... index.html

Boeing is likely to lose about 90 jet orders due to “geopolitical issues” related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the company said Tuesday.

The aircraft maker said it is not canceling the orders — yet. But it has placed them in an accounting limbo which it uses when there are questions about whether jet orders on its books are likely to be completed.

The company disclosed Tuesday that it added 141 jets to that accounting classification in March. About two-thirds of those orders — or just more than 90 — are for 737 Max jets that have been affected by the war in Ukraine and related economic sanctions.

The company has seen an increase of orders added to this accounting limbo in the last two years, as the pandemic caused a sharp drop in demand for new planes. Including the additions in March, there are now nearly 950 commercial jet orders deemed to have that uncertain status, leaving Boeing with a backlog of about 4,300 jets yet to build.

Sanctions are preventing any current aircraft sales to Russia. Boeing and other western aircraft makers such as Airbus have also cut off the supply of needed spare parts and maintenance support for planes in Russia in order to comply with sanctions. So doubts about future orders to Russia are no surprise.

Boeing’s data show only 30 737 Max jets orders from a Russian carrier, Utair Airlines. But most Russian airlines order jets from Boeing and rival Airbus through leasing companies. So there were likely more Boeing jets destined for Russia before the war.

Even if sanctions are lifted, the relationship between Russia and the leasing companies has probably been permanently damaged by Russia’s move to nationalize and take title of hundreds of planes owned by those companies.

Boeing also reported another seven 737 Max jets on order by Ukraine airline, SkyUp.

The good news for Boeing (BA) is that it had a net increase of 38 new orders during the month of March.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#737 Post by PHXPhlyer » Wed Apr 27, 2022 2:05 pm

Boeing delays its newest jet as losses soar

https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/27/investin ... index.html

The bad news keeps piling up for Boeing. The company is delaying the debut of its newest passenger jet to 2025, and it reported a much bigger-than-expected quarterly loss.

The company Wednesday announced it would temporarily pause the start of production for its 777X passenger jet, which it planned to start delivering to customers by the end of 2023. Demand for long-range and widebody passenger jets, a key to Boeing’s commercial jet business, continues to be hurt by weak demand for international flights during the pandemic.

Demand for Boeing’s freighter aircraft has remained strong, so it will go forward with the recently launched 777X freighter before it starts production of the 777X passenger jet. Boeing will continue to build both the earlier passenger and freighter versions of its 777 jet, known as the 777 Classic. Those models are due to be replaced by the 777X.

Pushing back plans for the 777X passenger jet will result in a total of $1.5 billion of abnormal costs for Boeing starting in the second quarter and continuing until production resumes.

The company also booked $1.2 billion in special charges in the first quarter, including a $660 million charge related to higher supplier costs, higher costs to finalize technical requirements and schedule delays for completion of planes that will be used as the next Air Force One planes. It also includes $212 million in charges related to disruption of business caused by sanctions on Russia related its invasion of Ukraine and a $367 million charge related to supply chain constraints, Covid-19 and inflationary pressures on its Red Hawk military jet.

Even excluding those charges, the company posted a core operating loss of $1.5 billion in the first quarter, much worse than the $353 million operating loss Boeing posted in the first quarter of 2021. Analysts surveyed by Refinitiv had forecast a core operating loss of just $399 million in the quarter.

Shares of Boeing (BA), a component of the Dow Jones industrial average, fell about 4% in premarket trading.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#738 Post by G-CPTN » Wed Apr 27, 2022 10:37 pm


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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#739 Post by PHXPhlyer » Thu Apr 28, 2022 5:04 am

Boeing ‘probably shouldn’t have taken’ Trump-negotiated Air Force One deal, CEO says

https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/27/politics ... index.html

Boeing’s CEO on Wednesday called the unusual deal his predecessor negotiated with then-President Donald Trump for the next generation of Air Force One a one-off that he hopes not to repeat.

“Air Force One, I’m just going to call a very unique moment, a very unique negotiation. A very unique set of risks that Boeing probably shouldn’t have taken,” CEO David Calhoun said. “But we are where we are.”

Boeing made the deal in 2018 after Trump publicly criticized the program’s costs, writing “Cancel order!” and amid Trump’s tough rhetoric on China that risked consequences for Boeing and other US exporters.

Calhoun spoke on the company’s quarterly earnings call and promised investors “a very different philosophy” to fixing in advance the price for military projects.

Boeing agreed to a fixed $3.9 billion price tag but has since encountered issues and higher costs that threaten to delay delivery of the two 747 jets until the end of 2026, approximately two years later than Boeing promised.

Earlier this month, the Air Force attributed the delay to a “combination of factors including impacts from the Covid-19 pandemic, interiors supplier transition, manpower limitations, wiring design timelines and test execution rates.” Boeing declined at the time to comment on the delay.

Calhoun said the coronavirus pandemic complicated work because only a limited number of workers have the high-level security clearances necessary to work on the project.

“When a Covid line goes down or a group of workers steps out, we don’t have a whole bunch of cleared people to step into their shoes,” he said.

“For VC-25B where the clearances are ultra-high, it’s really tough,” he continued, using the military model number to describe the jets.

The former President, with his deal-making persona, took an unusually hands-on approach to the Air Force One deal. He personally met with Boeing big-wigs at the White House to seal the deal. He also shared drawings for a new red, white and blue color scheme for the jets.

Other factors complicated the Trump-Boeing relationship. The company faced business pressure from his sharp criticism of China. Following a pair of deadly crashes, the President personally announced the grounding of Boeing’s 737 MAX jet – a matter typically handled by the Federal Aviation Administration. And his acting defense secretary, who ultimately withdrew from consideration for the permanent job after allegations of domestic violence surfaced, was a former Boeing executive.

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Re: More Boeing Bad News

#740 Post by Woody » Thu May 05, 2022 10:21 am

These delays in delivery are starting to affect the airlines as well, British Airways have 10 787-10 on order, with none delivered since last year and American have similar problems, there must be others as well :((

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerosp ... il%2020%20(,familiar%20with%20the%20matter%20said.
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