Re: More Boeing Bad News
Posted: Tue Nov 30, 2021 8:01 pm
Congress wants answers from FAA regarding Boeing 737Max.
https://transportation.house.gov/imo/me ... cluded.pdf
The Honorable Stephen M. Dickson
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
Dear Administrator Dickson:
Thank you for testifying before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Aviation last month. We appreciate the FAA’s ongoing work to
implement the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) to hold Boeing and other
aviation manufacturers accountable and to ensure the agency has the expertise and processes in
place to perform effective safety regulation and oversight. However, during the hearing, two issues
arose regarding your recollection of Boeing’s past actions in which we would like to receive a more
complete account from FAA.
Angle of Attack Disagree Alert
The first issue, as raised by Rep. Sharice Davids, concerns Boeing’s actions regarding the
Angle of Attack (AOA) Disagree alert. As documented in our September 2020 investigative report,
in August 2017 when Boeing first discovered that this alert was inoperable on more than 80 percent
of 737 MAX aircraft, Boeing decided to wait nearly three years to fix the problem so it could execute
the fix as a part of its then-planned rollout of the 737 MAX-10 in 2020.
1 Boeing also did not notify
the FAA, its MAX customers, or MAX pilots that the alert was not working and continued to
manufacture hundreds of more 737 MAX aircraft with the same non-functioning alert.2 Boeing
failed to divulge the fact that the alert was not functioning until October 2018, only after the fatal
Lion Air crash.
Page 2
2
Boeing defended its actions by saying this was not a safety issue, and they highlighted the
fact that a Boeing Authorized Representative, an individual authorized to perform work on behalf of
the FAA, concurred with Boeing’s decision to delay the fix.
4 However, the nonfunctioning AOA
Disagree alert appears to have violated the 737 MAX type design. As then-Acting Administrator
Dan Elwell said in a letter to our committee in July 2019:
Once certified by the FAA, all features included on the airplane
become part of the certified type design or approved type design.
These features are mandatory in each airplane produced to that type
design thereafter, whether or not they are required for safety . . .
Although an AOA disagree message was not necessary to meet
FAA safety regulations, once it was made part of the approved
type design, it was required to be installed and functional on all
737 MAX airplanes Boeing produced.
5
[Emphasis added.]
Our committee highlighted this issue, and Boeing’s action, in our investigative report on the
737 MAX not because we believed it was a safety issue, but because it was clearly a glaring issue of
lax accountability and oversight. Yet, to date, we are unaware of any actions the FAA has taken to
hold Boeing accountable for violating the approved type design of the 737 MAX, knowingly
continuing to manufacture the aircraft regardless of this known defect and failing to inform your
agency—or 737 MAX customers—of this nonfunctioning component on the aircraft until after the
Lion Air crash.
Boeing has claimed its senior leadership was unaware of these issues at the time. However,
our report showed that multiple individuals across the company were aware of this issue. If Boeing’s
senior management was unaware of these issues impacting more than 80 percent of the 737 MAX
fleet that rolled off its assembly line, then that should have raised serious questions within the
company about its ability to manage the production of its commercial aircraft fleet effectively and
safely.
Boeing’s actions showed an utter disregard for the FAA’s regulatory process. We
acknowledge that in your testimony you mentioned that you are taking steps to implement and
improve your oversight of Boeing. However, our direct questions are:
• What specifically has the FAA done to hold Boeing accountable for deceiving its
customers and violating the FAA’s regulations by knowingly producing 737 MAX
aircraft with nonfunctioning AOA Disagree alerts that resulted in the production of
nonconforming aircraft prior to the Lion Air crash?
Please be specific in your response and provide all records that indicate any actions the
FAA took against Boeing in regard to the issues outlined above. As part of your
response, please also inform the committee of whether the Boeing Authorized
Representative who concurred with Boeing’s decision to delay fixing the AOA Disagree
alert for three years is still authorized to conduct work on behalf of the FAA.
https://transportation.house.gov/imo/me ... cluded.pdf
The Honorable Stephen M. Dickson
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
Dear Administrator Dickson:
Thank you for testifying before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Aviation last month. We appreciate the FAA’s ongoing work to
implement the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) to hold Boeing and other
aviation manufacturers accountable and to ensure the agency has the expertise and processes in
place to perform effective safety regulation and oversight. However, during the hearing, two issues
arose regarding your recollection of Boeing’s past actions in which we would like to receive a more
complete account from FAA.
Angle of Attack Disagree Alert
The first issue, as raised by Rep. Sharice Davids, concerns Boeing’s actions regarding the
Angle of Attack (AOA) Disagree alert. As documented in our September 2020 investigative report,
in August 2017 when Boeing first discovered that this alert was inoperable on more than 80 percent
of 737 MAX aircraft, Boeing decided to wait nearly three years to fix the problem so it could execute
the fix as a part of its then-planned rollout of the 737 MAX-10 in 2020.
1 Boeing also did not notify
the FAA, its MAX customers, or MAX pilots that the alert was not working and continued to
manufacture hundreds of more 737 MAX aircraft with the same non-functioning alert.2 Boeing
failed to divulge the fact that the alert was not functioning until October 2018, only after the fatal
Lion Air crash.
Page 2
2
Boeing defended its actions by saying this was not a safety issue, and they highlighted the
fact that a Boeing Authorized Representative, an individual authorized to perform work on behalf of
the FAA, concurred with Boeing’s decision to delay the fix.
4 However, the nonfunctioning AOA
Disagree alert appears to have violated the 737 MAX type design. As then-Acting Administrator
Dan Elwell said in a letter to our committee in July 2019:
Once certified by the FAA, all features included on the airplane
become part of the certified type design or approved type design.
These features are mandatory in each airplane produced to that type
design thereafter, whether or not they are required for safety . . .
Although an AOA disagree message was not necessary to meet
FAA safety regulations, once it was made part of the approved
type design, it was required to be installed and functional on all
737 MAX airplanes Boeing produced.
5
[Emphasis added.]
Our committee highlighted this issue, and Boeing’s action, in our investigative report on the
737 MAX not because we believed it was a safety issue, but because it was clearly a glaring issue of
lax accountability and oversight. Yet, to date, we are unaware of any actions the FAA has taken to
hold Boeing accountable for violating the approved type design of the 737 MAX, knowingly
continuing to manufacture the aircraft regardless of this known defect and failing to inform your
agency—or 737 MAX customers—of this nonfunctioning component on the aircraft until after the
Lion Air crash.
Boeing has claimed its senior leadership was unaware of these issues at the time. However,
our report showed that multiple individuals across the company were aware of this issue. If Boeing’s
senior management was unaware of these issues impacting more than 80 percent of the 737 MAX
fleet that rolled off its assembly line, then that should have raised serious questions within the
company about its ability to manage the production of its commercial aircraft fleet effectively and
safely.
Boeing’s actions showed an utter disregard for the FAA’s regulatory process. We
acknowledge that in your testimony you mentioned that you are taking steps to implement and
improve your oversight of Boeing. However, our direct questions are:
• What specifically has the FAA done to hold Boeing accountable for deceiving its
customers and violating the FAA’s regulations by knowingly producing 737 MAX
aircraft with nonfunctioning AOA Disagree alerts that resulted in the production of
nonconforming aircraft prior to the Lion Air crash?
Please be specific in your response and provide all records that indicate any actions the
FAA took against Boeing in regard to the issues outlined above. As part of your
response, please also inform the committee of whether the Boeing Authorized
Representative who concurred with Boeing’s decision to delay fixing the AOA Disagree
alert for three years is still authorized to conduct work on behalf of the FAA.