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You might have but who cares...

........... or should the bearing be a "True" one!

There is only one True God. ( so they tell me ? )

Magnetism is the work of The Devil.

Just discovered that there’s a Meccameter app available for iOS and Android

Decoding of the (orange) 'black boxes' to start on 2 June in France. I suspect a lot of the 'mystery' will soon be solved.

Boac wrote: ↑

Sun May 31, 2020 9:10 am

Decoding of the (orange) 'black boxes' to start on 2 June in France. I suspect a lot of the 'mystery' will soon be solved.

Is the local accident investigation board obliged to release the content of the data recorders or can they postponed until the final report is produced?

Not sure where the 'options' lie in this sort of situation.

Seems a reasonable analysis of the perceived situation.

Stand down the French investigation - Stoneboat has it. An amazingly crafted video.

Highly credible scenario. How on earth can these pilots have missed all the warnings, aural, visual..?

Extraordinary...

TheGreenGoblin wrote: ↑

Tue Jun 02, 2020 10:10 pm

Highly credible scenario. How on earth can these pilots have missed all the warnings, aural, visual..?
Extraordinary...

Intoxicated?
Stoned?

I seem to recall reading at a safety report that hearing is the first sense to go under stress. So possibly they didn't hear the warning at all.

The only problem with Stoneboat's 'theory' is that as far as we know the speed over the threshold (NB Based on unreliable ADSB details) was 'well' under the AB gear blocking IAS of 260kts and reckoned to be about 210 'ish(!!!), so the gear would have been travelling if selected down. FDR/CVR will, hopefully tell all.

How landing gear works? If is selected down but because of the excessive speed stops it from deploying, once the speed is low enough does it automatically deploy or needs to be re-deployed when the situation allows it?

Mr Boeing allowed the 737NG gear to be deployed at any speed, there was no geek-inspired anti-idiot system to prevent lowering.
Presumably Mr Boeing assumed if one wanted/needed gear at outside normal limit speed then one could get it, probably to solve a potentially catastrophic excess energy problem.
Whilst I appreciate the PIA aircraft pod-scraping may have disrupted the fuel feed system thereby starving the donks of motion lotion, the CFM56s as fitted to BMI’s 737-400 G-OBMM continued to run and perform for a satisfactory approach and landing using partial flap at Luton in the late 90s, having dumped ALL both engine’s oil contents in the climb out of EMA.
This was due to a component critical to the oil system being left detached from BOTH engines after a HP borescope inspection on BOTH engines during overnight maintenance.
So once again, Mr Boeing did not think it necessary to incorporate auto-shutdown of any engine which lost oil contents but as the video implies is this what Mr Airboos incorporated?
As an aside, following the G-OBMM accident (no injuries) both aircraft manufacturers strongly recommended NOT performing safety critical maintenance on all engines, without special checking measures, on the same maintenance operation, just in case...
The Lockheed Tristan which only just made it back to land on the Florida coast due to missing O-ring seals from the MCDs was another near disaster.
This recommendation was not followed by BA, who know better, as a result of which they had the engine cowlings accident at LHR some years later.
Acknowledge slight thread drift, back to the PIA accident which, according to the video was commanded by their “most experienced captain”. Couple that with the culture of ‘deity’ in the LHS and we await the next major CRM failure...

<<Mr Boeing allowed the 737NG gear to be deployed at any speed, there was no geek-inspired anti-idiot system to prevent lowering.
Presumably Mr Boeing assumed if one wanted/needed gear at outside normal limit speed then one could get it, probably to solve a potentially catastrophic excess energy problem.>>

As did Mr. Grumman, with a caveat. The G1 was redlined at 290 KIAS/M.54. The main gear also functioned the speed brakes, and the speed brakes could be deployed at 310 KIAS, just in case your mind had wandered and you didn't hear the o/speed warning. (Normal gear speed was 210 kt, I seem to recall)

I'm not sure how many of you got involved with the Air Blue 202 crash at Islamabad in July 2010 - that was a good indication of the standard of pilots in the region. Crashed into hills 8 mls north of the field while 'circling within 5 mls' of the airport. Some of the stuff coming up on the PIA forum at the time was horrendous.

I fear we will see the same again. I see a badly burned young girl, (resident in the housing area) has finally sadly died from her burns. That is the first ground fatality I believe, which as I said before is staggering.

Back in the early 70s, I worked for PIA for about three years, based in Manchester. On one occasion I was on my way from Karachi and it was during the days when they used to stop in Tirana. This was purely political,because at the time, PIA had flights into China (who were basically subsidising the dictator Enver Hoxha after he'd fallen out with the Soviets). After take-off from Baghdad, I went up to the flight deck for the transit and landing in Tirana, with an STA of around 0600. It was September. We were handed over to Tirana by Belgrade centre, but they failed to respond. The captain called Belgrade and said he couldn't raise them. Belgrade said they would call them on the landline and to stand by. They also tried to raise Tirana, but failed to get a reply and asked the captain what his intentions were. (Belgrade was our flight-planned alternate). The captain asked asked BEG to stand by and then said to us, "This happened once before - there is a solution." The weather was CAVOK and he continued his descent towards Tirana. It was beginning to get light and the lights of the city were clearly visible. The captain continued his descent towards the airport.

The airfield was clearly visible and he descended along the extended centreline, using a standard approach procedure. As we glided over the piano keys, he put on full power and began a slow climb (this was in a B720) and turned left towards the Adriatic. Doubtless the noise reverberated around the surrounding mountains, because slowly but surely, lights began to appear on the airfield. He called the tower and after three attempts got a response. The usual procedures took place and we landed safely. Discreet enquiries after landing revealed that the airport had been kept open late the previous night and since there was no transport available into the capital at that hour, the essential staff had slept overnight at the airport, no doubt after having consumed copious quantities of Raki! The captain told me later that he had experienced this previously and did not fancy a diversion to Belgrade and the staff had told him that if it happened again he should fly down the runway to wake them up!